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Sharing Risk with the Government: 
How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide 
evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce 
expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a 
firm’s upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk 
taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in 
response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D 
risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on 
risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss-offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity 
to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxation is one of the most important tools governments use to influence the economy. 
Taxes affect many aspects of economic activity, from individuals’ labor supply, consumption, 
and savings decisions to companies’ hiring, location, and capital investment choices. In this 
paper, we ask how taxes on corporate income affect corporate risk taking. As Solow (1956) notes, 
risk taking is essential for both firms and economies to grow in the long run.  
Income taxes affect corporate risk taking because they induce an asymmetry in a firm’s 
payoffs. This basic insight can be traced back to early work on individuals’ risk-taking choices in 
response to personal income taxes (Domar and Musgrave 1944; Feldstein 1969; Stiglitz 1969) 
and to subsequent applications to the corporate setting (Green and Talmor 1985). A simple 
numerical example serves to illustrate the intuition. Suppose there are two projects (A and B) and 
two equally likely outcomes (“good” and “bad”). Project A yields a profit of $40 in both 
scenarios; project B yields a profit of $100 in the good scenario but a loss of $20 in the bad 
scenario. Project risk is idiosyncratic and hence diversifiable. Absent taxes, the expected profit of 
each project is $40 and so a risk-neutral firm will be indifferent between the projects.  
Now suppose the tax rate increases from zero to 30%. This reduces the expected after-tax 
profit of both projects, but risky project B is more affected than safe project A: B’s expected 
profit falls to $25 while A’s falls to only $28.1 The greater reduction (of $3) in project B’s 
expected profit stems from the fact that the government shares in the profit but not in the loss. 
Given this asymmetry, a risk-neutral firm will now prefer the safe project to the risky project.2 
Generalizing from the example, we predict that firms should respond to a tax increase by 
choosing safer projects and thereby reducing the risks they take. 
                                                 
1 For project A, $40×(1–0.3) = $28; for project B, 0.5×[(1–0.3)×$100–$20] = $25.  
2 Firms are commonly modeled as being risk-neutral, but this is not crucial to the argument. 
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As Domar and Musgrave (1944) argue, introducing loss-offsets into the tax code can modify 
this prediction. Consider the extreme case in which losses can be completely written off against 
past or future profits. In this case, the pre-tax and post-tax ordering of the two projects are 
identical because both the upside and the downside are reduced at the same tax rate.3 In practice, 
the tax code permits at most a partial offset of losses, in which case the upside is reduced by 
more than the downside. A tax increase will then reduce the expected profit of the risky project 
by more than that of the safe project and firms should respond by reducing risk.  
Absent other frictions, these arguments apply symmetrically to tax increases and tax cuts, so 
firms should respond to cuts by increasing risk. In practice, there is reason to expect asymmetry. 
As the literature on risk-shifting emphasizes, higher risk reduces the value of claims held by 
creditors. Whether a firm can respond to a tax cut by increasing risk then depends on the extent 
to which creditors constrain its behavior, e.g., by means of debt covenants. In the presence of 
such constraints, the effect of a tax cut on risk taking is likely attenuated for many firms. 
A key challenge when testing how taxes affect corporate policies is that a firm’s tax status is 
often endogenous to its policies. For example, a firm’s choice of investment projects will affect 
its future marginal tax rate. The literature confronts this identification challenge in various ways. 
One approach is to exploit changes in federal income tax rates. Unfortunately, federal tax 
changes suffer from two shortcomings: they are few and far between, and they affect virtually all 
firms in the economy at the same time, making it difficult to find control firms with which to 
establish a plausible counterfactual. A second approach is to exploit cross-country differences in 
tax policies. This typically results in a larger number of tax “shocks” than in studies using federal 
tax changes, but often requires implausible assumptions about treated firms and their controls 
being comparable despite operating in different countries. 
                                                 
3 In our numerical example, project B’s expected profit with full loss offsets is $28, the same as A’s.  
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We adopt a third approach, pioneered by Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015), Heider 
and Ljungqvist (2015), and Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016). The approach exploits the fact 
that U.S. companies pay not only federal income tax but also taxes in the various states in which 
they operate. As Heider and Ljungqvist note, state taxes are a meaningful part of U.S. firms’ 
overall tax burden, accounting for about 21% of total income taxes paid in Compustat. Changes 
in state corporate income tax rates are numerous (we count 113 between 1990 and 2011) and, 
because they are staggered across states and time, lend themselves to a differences-in-differences 
research design. As long as the usual identifying assumptions plausibly hold, such a design can 
disentangle the effects of tax changes from other macroeconomic shocks that affect firms’ risk 
taking by establishing a counterfactual – what level of risk would firms have chosen absent the 
tax change? – using as controls firms that experience similar economic conditions (in time, space, 
and industry) but are not themselves subject to a tax change.  
By way of preview, we have four main results. First, we find that firms respond to tax 
increases by reducing their earnings volatility, as expected. To illustrate, a treated firm reduces 
its earnings volatility by 2.6% in response to the average tax increase of 136 basis points, relative 
to other firms in the same industry that are not subject to a tax change in their headquarter state 
that year.4 This point estimate is likely conservative, given that firms are taxed not just in their 
home state but in every state in which they have operations (their so called “nexus” states). This 
means that a given state’s tax change applies to less than a multi-state firm’s entire tax base, so 
tests that ignore the geographic distribution of a firm’s tax base likely understate the sensitivity 
of risk taking to corporate income taxes. To address this issue, we construct a measure of state 
tax changes that takes into account each firm’s tax exposure to each state. Doing so yields tax 
                                                 
4 This effect is estimated over the 3 years following a tax increase; it becomes stronger when we give firms more 
time to adjust their risk profiles. Over the 6 years following a tax increase, for example, the average treated firm 
reduces risk by a cumulative 4.8%. 
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sensitivities that are between 25% and 60% larger than our baseline estimates. 
Second, investigating possible channels, we find that the main ways in which firms achieve 
these risk reductions are efforts to shorten their operating cycles (which puts less capital at risk, 
in particular in the form of inventories) and to find less risky ways to commercialize their R&D 
projects. We find no evidence that firms tinker with their operating leverage, nor that they 
change the level of their capital expenditures or R&D spending in response to state tax changes.  
Third, we find evidence consistent with an asymmetric tax sensitivity: firms do not, on 
average, respond significantly to tax cuts, especially on a nexus-weighted basis. This finding is 
consistent with our argument that firms face constraints on their ability to increase risk, for 
example, in the form of covenants imposed by their creditors. If so, we expect firms with low 
financial leverage to face fewer constraints and so to be more responsive to tax cuts. Consistent 
with this conjecture, we find that low-leverage firms increase risk in response to tax cuts (by 6-7% 
for each percentage-point cut in taxes). High-leverage firms, on the other hand, do not.  
Fourth, we find support for Domar and Musgrave’s (1944) argument that the ability to offset 
losses against past or future profits should weaken the negative effect of income taxes on risk 
taking. To establish this result, we collect detailed information on how state tax loss carryback 
and carryforward rules have evolved over time. When we sort firms by their ability to offset tax 
losses, we find that the negative effect of tax increases on risk taking is largely driven by firms 
with a limited ability to offset losses. We also test how firms respond to the rule changes 
themselves using a diff-in-diff setup. Firms’ responses to changes in offset rules broadly mirror 
their responses to changes in tax rates. In particular, they asymmetrically reduce risk when their 
ability to carry back losses is reduced.  
A causal interpretation of our findings requires that the diff-in-diff identifying assumptions 
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plausibly hold. Threats to identification in our setting principally come from three directions: a 
failure of the parallel-trends assumption, the possibility that local shocks trigger both states to 
change their tax rates and firms to adjust their risk taking, leading to a spurious correlation 
between tax and risk, and the potential for anticipation effects to bias the estimated tax 
sensitivities. We perform a battery of tests designed to investigate these identification challenges.  
A standard dynamic test shows that treated and control firms exhibit similar trends in risk 
taking before the state tax rate changes, supporting the parallel-trends assumption. To remove 
potential confounding effects coming from unobserved changes in local economic conditions 
that diffuse across state borders, we restrict the sample of controls to firms in states neighboring 
treated firms’ home states. This allows us to difference away unobserved confounding effects, 
assuming that economic conditions are similar in neighboring states while tax policies stop at the 
state’s border. Our results are robust to this design. As for confounds whose effects coincide in 
time with the treatment and do not diffuse across state borders, we show that coincident policy 
changes (such as changes in state investment incentive programs) do not drive our results; 
moreover, an Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) type test suggests that selection on unobservables 
is not a major concern in our setting. Finally, we argue that changes in risk taking of the kind we 
identify in our setting are not reasonably subject to major adjustment costs, which lessens 
concerns that anticipation effects bias our estimates (Hennessy and Strebulaev 2015). 
Empirically, we find no evidence that firms change risk in anticipation of future tax changes. 
Our study makes contributions to several literatures. First, it contributes to the tax literature 
and to the literature on the effects of taxes on corporate policies by documenting that firms fine-
tune their risk profiles when their tax rates change and that they do so in a way that is consistent 
with the theoretical insights of Domar and Musgrave (1944), Feldstein (1969), and Stiglitz 
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(1969). Prior work on the effects of taxes on corporate policies largely focuses on firms’ capital 
structure (following Modigliani and Miller 1958) and investment choices (following Hall and 
Jorgenson 1967). The latter body of work is particularly relevant in our context. Its focus is on 
the effect of taxes on the level of investment. As Hines (1998) notes, this focus has met with little 
empirical success: “The apparent inability of tax incentives to stimulate aggregate investment 
spending is one of the major puzzles in the empirical investment literature” (p. 2). We extend this 
body of work by showing that corporate taxes affect firms’ choice of risk taking.  
Second, our study adds a new angle to the literature on corporate risk taking by identifying 
taxes as an important determinant. While prior work highlights many other determinants, tax has 
largely been ignored.5 A notable exception is a recent working paper by Langenmayr and Lester 
(2015) whose best identified evidence comes from a change in a rule governing tax loss-offsets 
affecting a limited sample of small Spanish firms.6 Our study takes a broader perspective. Our 
main focus, motivated by the analysis of Domar and Musgrave (1944), is not on variation in tax 
loss-offset rules but on variation in tax rates. Specifically, we focus on the sensitivity of risk 
taking to tax rates, on the way tax loss-offset provisions moderate this sensitivity, and on 
asymmetry in this sensitivity in the presence of constraints imposed by creditors on a firm’s 
ability to increase risk.  
Compared to the extant empirical literature on corporate risk taking, our main advantage is 
                                                 
5 Among these other determinants are managerial risk aversion and career concerns (May 1995; Gormley and Matsa 
2016), the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006), option compensation 
(Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn 2013), inside debt (Cassell, Huang, Manuel Sanchez, 
and Stuart 2012; Choy, Lin, and Officer 2014), corporate governance (John, Litov, and Yeung 2008), Sarbanes–
Oxley (Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2010), creditor rights (Acharya, Amihud, and Litov 2011), and diversification 
(Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2011). 
6 Using a sharp regression discontinuity design, Langenmayr and Lester find that Spanish firms with revenues just 
above EUR 20 million significantly reduced their earnings volatility when their ability to offset losses was limited in 
2011, as compared to firms just below the revenue threshold. One of our empirical findings is similar, in that U.S. 
firms reduce risk when state-level offset rules become less generous, though given the differences in research design, 
we view Langenmayr and Lester’s results as having more limited external validity. 
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identification: our diff-in-diff approach not only establishes a set of plausible counterfactuals 
taken from the same legal, regulatory, and business environment, but it also mitigates, when 
paired with a focus on adjacent states, omitted-variable biases resulting from the confounding 
influence of unobserved local shocks. These features of our research design go some way 
towards permitting a causal interpretation of our results, which is critical for academic research 
to be informative to policymakers (Leuz and Wysocki 2016).  
Finally, our results add nuance to the hedging literature. A parallel literature on risk 
management shows that firms hedge to reduce income volatility with a view to increasing debt 
capacity (Smith and Stulz 1985; Graham and Rogers 2002). It is possible that increased hedging 
contributes to the tax-induced reduction in risk taking we observe. This would be interesting 
because the hedging literature has so far found little support for taxes being an important reason 
why firms engage in hedging.  
2. Research Design, Institutional Setting, and Sample and Data 
2.1 Empirical Strategy 
We use a diff-in-diff framework to estimate the effect of changes in state corporate income 
tax rates on firms’ risk-taking choices. Our baseline regression takes the following form: 
, , , , , , , 1 , , , ,i j s t s t s t s t i t j t i j s tRisk T T Z X                  , (1) 
where i, j, s, and t index firms, industries, states, and years, respectively. is the first-difference 
operator. Riski,j,s,t is a measure of firm i’s risk taking (defined in Section 2.3). Zs,t represents state-
level control variables measured as of year t, while Xi,t-1 is a vector of firm-level control variables 
measured as of t–1.7 The j,t are SIC4 industry-by-year fixed effects. i,j,s,t is the usual error term. 
Given the state-level nature of the tax variation we exploit, we cluster standard errors by state 
                                                 
7 Consistent with prior research, we use beginning-of-year (i.e., year t–1) values for the firm-level controls as these 
variables are likely affected by a firm’s concurrent risk-taking choices (Gow, Larker, and Reiss 2016). 
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(Petersen 2009).8  
The variables of interest are ,s tT
  and ,s tT  , which measure the magnitude of a tax increase 
or a tax cut in either a firm’s home state or across its nexus states in year t. Details of these tax 
changes and how they are computed are provided in Section 2.2. Since each tax-change variable 
is measured in absolute terms, corporate risk taking is reduced in response to a tax increase if 
β<0 and increased in response to a tax cut if γ>0.  
Estimating Eq. (1) in first-differenced form removes firm-specific fixed effects and potential 
confounding effects from time-invariant state-level conditions or policies (e.g., political parties 
or fiscal policies). An advantage of a first-differenced specification over a levels specification 
with firm fixed effects is that first-differencing can accommodate repeated treatments, treatment 
reversals, and asymmetry in firms’ responses to tax changes. Including industry-by-year fixed 
effects removes unobserved time-varying industry shocks by comparing the behavior of treated 
and control firms in the same industry at the same point in time. 
To illustrate our research design, consider Pennsylvania (PA). In 1991, PA raised its top 
corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 12.25%. Following this tax increase, stock market-listed 
firms headquartered in PA reduced risk by about 10% on average. From the point of view of an 
individual firm in PA, this tax shock is plausibly exogenous: presumably, no firm would have 
lobbied for the tax increase. Exogeneity with respect to individual firms’ characteristics is not, 
however, sufficient to establish causality: other coincident developments, such as changes in 
investment opportunities in PA, could be responsible for the reduction in corporate risk taking.  
To control for such contemporaneous developments, our baseline model in Eq. (1) compares 
risk changes among PA firms to the contemporaneous risk changes among firms in the same 
                                                 
8 Our results are robust to alternative approaches (see the Online Appendix). 
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industry that are located in other states without a tax change in 1991, say, in New York (NY). To 
the extent that PA firms and NY firms are faced with similar changes in their prospects, the 
contemporaneous change in risk among NY firms provides a counterfactual estimate of how PA 
firms’ risk choices would have evolved absent the tax increase. The difference-in-differences, 
that is, the difference across firms in different states of the within-firm risk change around the tax 
increase, provides an estimate of the tax sensitivity of corporate risk taking.  
Eq. (1) generalizes this illustrative example in that it exploits variation in taxes across many 
states and years. For any change in corporate income taxes in state s and year t, the potential 
control states are all those states that did not change their corporate income taxes in that year. In 
addition, Eq. (1) also controls for time-varying firm and state factors, as well as unobserved 
time-invariant firm characteristics and time-varying industry shocks. 
As discussed in the introduction, a causal interpretation of the coefficients of interest in Eq. 
(1) requires that risk taking at treated and control firms follow parallel trends, that state tax 
changes do not coincide systematically with variation in local business cycles or other tax or 
non-tax state policies that might independently affect firms’ risk taking, and that changes in state 
tax policies be unanticipated. We present tests designed to address potential violations of these 
identifying assumptions in Section 3.2.  
2.2 Institutional Setting 
2.2.1 Changes in state corporate income tax rates 
Table A.1 in the Online Appendix provides an overview of all changes in state corporate 
income tax rates over the period 1990 to 2011. We start in 1990 because one of our control 
variables requires two lags of cash flow statement data, and cash flow data are only available via 
Compustat since 1988. We end in 2011 to give firms time to adjust their risk profiles after taxes 
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change. Panel A lists 40 tax increases in 24 states (including Washington, DC) affecting 1,152 
sample firms in fiscal years 1990–2011, while Panel B lists 73 tax cuts in 27 states (including 
DC) affecting 4,920 firms in fiscal years 1990–2011.9 The average tax shock increases tax rates 
by 93 basis points and the average tax cut reduces tax rates by 55 basis points. 
Our main variables of interest are the magnitude of tax increase and magnitude of tax cut in a 
firm’s headquarter state in a given fiscal year, in each case measured as the absolute value of the 
difference between this year’s and last year’s tax rate. From time to time, firms move their 
headquarters from one state to another. Compustat provides information only on a firm’s current 
headquarter state. To remedy this flaw, we use Heider and Ljungqvist’s (2015) hand-collected 
data on firms’ historical headquarter states. Based on these data, the average (median) treated 
firm experiences a tax increase of 136 (106) basis points and a tax cut of 53 (44) basis points.  
Firms are taxed in every state in which they have a physical presence (their so called “nexus” 
states).10 To reduce the scope for profit-shifting and tax arbitrage, states do not attempt to 
measure actual profits earned in-state. Instead, under the 1957 Uniform Division of Income for 
Tax Purposes Act, a multi-state firm’s federal taxable income is apportioned to each nexus state 
using a formula based on an average of the fractions of the firm’s total payroll, sales, and 
property located in that state. This has two consequences for our analysis. First, it is not 
necessary for us to map a firm’s projects to a specific state (which data limitations prevent us 
from doing): a firm can respond to a tax change in state A by changing the risk profile of its 
projects in any state it operates in. Second, the extent to which a multi-state firm is exposed to a 
                                                 
9 In coding which firms are affected by tax changes when, we are careful to capture whether a tax change affects 
firms with fiscal years ending or beginning on or after the effective date. This affects when it makes sense for a firm 
to react. We lose 8 of Heider and Ljungqvist’s (2015) 121 tax changes, partly because our sample starts later, partly 
because two of their tax changes (in North Dakota in 2007 and 2009) affect none of the firms satisfying our 
sampling criteria, and partly because we lack a clear prediction for how changes from gross receipts taxes to income 
taxes (or vice versa) affect firm risk-taking.  
10 As of 2011, three states (Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming) do not impose income taxes, and three states 
(Ohio, Texas, and Washington) impose gross receipts taxes rather than income taxes. 
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given state income tax change depends on the extent of its nexus to that state.  
To measure the magnitude of tax shocks experienced by multi-state firms more accurately, 
we approximate the geographic distribution of their tax liabilities using location data for their 
subsidiaries, branches, and plants. Specifically, we match Compustat firms by name to the 
National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database, which contains a comprehensive record of 
all business establishments in the U.S. since 1989.11 We then calculate the weighted change in 
state tax rates in a firm’s nexus states in a fiscal year as follows: 
ts
s ttotali
tsi
ttotali
tsi
ti Tsales
sales
employees
employees
ratetax ,
,,
,,
,,
,,
, 2
1
2
1 


   ,  (2)
 
where employeesi,s,t and salesi,s,t are firm i’s number of employees and sales in state s in year t, 
respectively, and employeesi,total,t and salesi,total,t are the corresponding firm totals across all nexus 
states in year t, respectively. Ts,tis the change in the corporate income tax rate in state s in year 
t. Eq. (2) approximates a firm’s nexus with each state using a 50/50 average of the fractions of 
the firm’s total employment and sales in that state. Based on the magnitude and sign of the 
weighted tax change in Eq. (2), we define two alternative variables of interest: nexus-weighted 
tax increase and nexus-weighted tax cut, in each case measured in absolute terms. 
2.2.2 Tax loss carryback/carryforward rules 
The effect of taxes on risk taking is moderated by tax loss-offset provisions (Domar and 
Musgrave 1944). Most states have loss-offset rules. For example, in 2011, about a third of states 
allow firms to offset current losses against income earned in the past 2 or 3 years, and all states 
allow firms to carry current losses forward, for periods ranging from 5 to 20 years. To examine 
heterogeneous treatment effects, we collect data on state tax loss carryback/carryforward rules 
over our sample period. We also use changes in these rules as an alternative source of policy 
                                                 
11 Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2007) assess NETS along various dimensions and conclude that it is generally 
reliable. The name match is borrowed from Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016). 
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shocks to examine the effects of corporate taxation on firm risk taking. 
Table A.2 in the Online Appendix provides details of changes in state tax loss 
carryback/carryforward rules for our sample period. Panel A lists 15 increases in the loss 
carryback period in 11 states (including DC) affecting 430 sample firms in fiscal years 1990–
2011, while Panel B lists 36 reductions in the loss carryback period in 26 states (including DC) 
affecting 1,164 firms. At the state-level, the average increase is 2.13 years while the average 
reduction is 1.75 years. The average (median) treated firm experiences an increase of 2.04 (2) 
years and a reduction of 1.83 (1) years. 
Panel C lists 47 increases in the loss carryforward period in 37 states (including DC) 
affecting 5,349 sample firms in fiscal years 1990–2011, while Panel D lists 10 reductions in the 
loss carryforward period in eight states affecting 1,828 firms. The variation in carryforward 
periods is larger than for carryback periods. At the state-level, increases average 6.43 years, 
while reductions average 8.2 years. The average (median) treated firm experiences an increase in 
the carryforward period of 6.65 (5) years and a reduction of 9.58 (10) years. 
2.2.3 Other state-level tax policy changes 
Appendix A shows that changes in state corporate income tax rates and loss-offset rules 
rarely coincide with each other or with changes in investment incentive programs (i.e., tax 
credits for investment, R&D, and job creation). It is thus unlikely that our results are confounded 
by coincident changes in these state policies. The only area of overlap we find is with bank taxes: 
28 of the 40 corporate tax increases coincide with bank tax increases and 56 of the 73 corporate 
tax cuts coincide with bank tax cuts. Since bank tax changes could trigger changes in the supply 
of bank loans, we verify that our results are robust to controlling for changes in bank taxes.12  
                                                 
12 Banks have a unique status for state tax purposes (Koch 2005). They are taxed on a different schedule from 
corporations and so are subject to their own tax changes. When a state increases its bank tax, it reduces the after-tax 
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2.3 Sample and Data 
2.3.1 Sample  
Our sample begins with all firm-year observations in the merged CRSP-Compustat database 
for fiscal years 1990 to 2011. We exclude financial firms (SIC=6; 27,197 observations), utilities 
(SIC=49; 7,174 observations), public-sector entities (SIC=9; 2,187 observations), non-U.S. firms 
(17,289 observations), and firms headquartered outside the U.S. (954 observations). We delete 
firms without stock return data, firms not traded on a major U.S. stock exchange (NYSE, Amex, 
or Nasdaq), and firms with a CRSP share code >11 (47,666 observations). Observations with 
negative or missing total assets (30,281 observations) are also excluded. Requiring non-missing 
data for our risk measures and control variables and their lagged values leaves us with a final 
panel of 64,447 firm-year observations for 8,046 firms. 
2.3.2 Measures of risk taking 
We view a firm as a portfolio of projects which can differ in their risks. At each instant, the 
firm can close down existing projects and add new ones. While we do not observe these project-
level choices, we do observe the aggregate cash flows they generate. We thus measure corporate 
risk taking as the firm-level volatility of aggregate cash flows, defined in two different ways.  
Our first measure of risk taking, ROA volatility, is the standard deviation of seasonally 
adjusted quarterly pre-tax returns on assets (ROA) over the three-year period from year t to t+2, 
where pre-tax ROA is operating income after depreciation (i.e., earnings before interest and taxes) 
divided by the book value of total assets and the seasonal adjustment for firm i in quarter q of 
year t is computed as , , , , , 1,i t q i t q i t qROA ROA ROA     (Correia, Kang, and Richardson 2015). The 
first difference of ROA volatility for year t is the log-transformed standard deviation computed 
                                                                                                                                                             
profit on every loan made to borrowers located in the state, regardless of the lender’s own location. Variation in a 
state’s bank taxes can thus induce variation in the supply of loans available to firms located in the state. 
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over years t to t+2 minus the log-transformed standard deviation computed over years t–3 to t–
1.13  
Our second measure of risk taking, ROIC volatility, is the standard deviation of seasonally 
adjusted quarterly pre-tax returns on invested capital (ROIC) over a three-year period from year t 
to t+2. Following Lundholm and Sloan (2012), we compute ROIC as operating income after 
depreciation divided by the sum of debt, minority interests, preferred stock, and common stock.14  
Note that because both variables are measured before interest and taxes, they capture 
business (or asset) risk rather than the effects of financing risk. This is important because it is 
well-known that tax changes can prompt firms to change their financial leverage. Our measures 
are thus designed to isolate the effects of taxes on the real (rather than financial) risks firms take.  
In a robustness test, we use two market-based measures as alternative measures of risk taking, 
namely, the standard deviation of stock returns and the de-leveraged standard deviation of stock 
returns. We prefer the earnings-based risk measures because they more likely reflect a firm’s 
choice of risk (stock returns not being under the firm’s control). 
2.3.3 Control variables and descriptive statistics 
Following prior research (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006), our baseline specification in 
Eq. (1) controls for the following firm characteristics: age, size, market-to-book ratio, book 
leverage, cash surplus, loss carry-forward, sales growth, and annual stock return. (See Appendix 
B for definitions.) Table 1 presents summary statistics. The average (median) ROA volatility is 
6.8% (3.8%), and the average (median) ROIC volatility is 10.6% (5.3%). Given the skewed 
distribution of these two risk measures, we use their log-transformed values in our regression 
                                                 
13 To construct these measures, we use data from Compustat Quarterly for fiscal years 1987 to 2013. 
14 ROIC is also called return on net operating assets (RNOA). Some researchers view non-operating cash as negative 
debt and subtract total cash from invested capital in computing ROIC. However, in the presence of financial frictions, 
non-operating cash should not be viewed as negative debt (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2007). Moreover, firms 
generally do not disclose how much cash they hold for non-operating purposes (Lundholm and Sloan 2012).  
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analysis. The average firm in our sample is 19.6 years old and has total assets of $1,755.2 million.  
Our baseline specification also controls for two state-level variables intended to capture local 
variation in economic conditions: the real growth rate in gross state product (GSP) and the state 
unemployment rate. The mean home-state GSP growth rate is 2.7% and the mean unemployment 
rate is 5.9%. We consider further state-level controls when we address identification concerns. 
3. State Corporate Income Taxes  
3.1 Baseline Estimates of the Effect of State Corporate Income Tax Changes on Risk Taking 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating Eq. (1). Columns 1 and 2 model how firms respond 
to tax changes in their headquarter states. In the regression with ROA volatility as the dependent 
variable (column 1), the coefficient on magnitude of tax increase is -0.019 (p=0.007), suggesting 
that firms reduce risk taking in response to a tax increase. The effect is both statistically and 
economically significant. The point estimate suggests that the average treated firm, whose home-
state tax rate increases by 136 basis points, reduces its risk taking by 2.6% relative to other firms 
in the same industry that are not subject to tax changes in their own home state that year. In 
column 2, where we use ROIC volatility as the dependent variable, the coefficient on magnitude 
of tax increase is -0.020 (p=0.006) – nearly identical to the point estimate in column 1. 
The models shown in columns 1 and 2 relate the difference in volatility measured over fiscal 
years t to t+2 and volatility measured over fiscal years t–3 to t–1 to tax changes occurring in 
fiscal year t. In columns 3 and 4, we lag the tax changes by one year to allow for delays in firms’ 
responses to tax changes. This produces stronger results for ROA volatility and similar results for 
ROIC volatility: ROA volatility falls by 2.6 percentage points for every one-percentage-point 
increase in the tax rate (p<0.001), while ROIC volatility falls by 1.9 percentage points (p=0.047).  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 model how firms respond to contemporaneous changes in their 
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nexus-state weighted income tax rates. As discussed earlier, the weighted tax-change measures 
attempt to approximate the shock to a firm’s actual state-tax burden. In column 5, where the 
dependent variable is ROA volatility, the coefficient on nexus-weighted tax increase is -0.024 
(p=0.011), suggesting that a one-percentage-point increase in a firm’s nexus-weighted tax rate 
reduces its risk taking by 2.4% relative to control firms in the same industry and year. In column 
6, the coefficient on nexus-weighted tax increase is -0.032 (p=0.005) when we use ROIC 
volatility as the dependent variable. The effects estimated for nexus-weighted tax changes are 
thus larger than those for home-state tax changes, confirming our prediction that ignoring the 
geographic distribution of firms’ tax bases understates the tax sensitivity of firms’ risk taking. 
Results using home-state tax changes are hence conservative.15 
The contemporaneous effect of tax cuts is to increase risk taking. The effect is large, but 
unlike the effect of tax increases, it is not statistically significant. For example, in column 1, the 
coefficient on magnitude of tax cut is 0.016 with a p-value of 0.322. The results for ROIC 
volatility or when using nexus-weighted tax changes show a similar pattern. When lagged, the 
effect of tax cuts on risk taking is close to zero.16  
The finding that firms more strongly and more consistently respond to tax increases than to 
tax cuts could be a power problem,17 or it could be due to external constraints on firms’ ability to 
increase risk. A natural source of constraints on corporate risk taking is creditors, whose claims 
fall in value as risk increases. To investigate this possibility, we sort firms into those with low 
                                                 
15 Among the control variables, we find that risk increases by less as the firm ages or grows in size. Firms with a 
higher market-to-book ratio change risk more, while firms with higher financial leverage, more cash surplus, and 
higher stock returns change risk less. Firms with higher sales growth rates and loss carryforwards change risk more. 
The two state-level control variables are also marginally significant. Firms increase risk as the GSP growth rate falls 
and as the state unemployment rate increases. 
16 While the difference in the sensitivity to tax increases and to tax cuts is small and not statistically significant for 
contemporaneous tax changes, it is economically large and statistically significant for ROA volatility when we use 
lagged tax changes. 
17 This reduced sensitivity to tax cuts is not due to tax cuts being smaller, on average, than tax increases in our 
sample: as Table A.4 in the Online Appendix shows, similar results obtain when we focus on large tax cuts. 
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financial leverage (assumed to face fewer constraints) and those with high leverage (assumed to 
face more constraints), measured as of the end of previous fiscal year. Table 3 reports the results. 
Consistent with our conjecture, firms with low leverage do, in fact, increase risk taking 
significantly in response to a tax cut, whereas firms with high leverage do not.18  
A more direct way to test our conjecture would be to measure the tightness of contractual 
constraints imposed on borrowers in the form of covenants. While data on covenants are 
available only for a subset of our sample firms, and even then are patchy, we find quite similar 
results: firms with few or lax covenants increase risk more strongly in response to tax cuts than 
do firms with many or tight covenants; see Table A.5 in the Online Appendix. 
3.2 Identification Challenges 
Threats to a causal interpretation of the findings reported in the previous section come from 
potential violations of our identifying assumptions. In this section, we report dynamic tests to 
shed light on the parallel-trends assumption, tests designed to deal with changes in local 
economic conditions that coincide with state tax changes, and tests that deal with potential 
anticipation effects. If anything, these refinements strengthen our conclusion insofar as they yield 
typically somewhat larger point estimates of the sensitivity of corporate risk taking to tax 
increases. We also continue to find evidence that firms respond to tax changes asymmetrically.  
3.2.1 Parallel trends 
As in any diff-in-diff test, a causal interpretation of the effect of tax changes on risk taking 
requires that treated and control firms follow parallel trends absent the tax change. To test for 
parallel trends, Table 4 includes lead terms of the tax change variables. These are measured as of 
                                                 
18 Table 3 also shows that firms’ sensitivity to tax increases does not vary with their leverage. This rules out an 
alternative interpretation of our baseline results, namely that firms reduce risk when taxes increase not because their 
tax function has become more convex but simply because doing so allows them to more easily increase their 
financial leverage. 
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year t+3, given that we use 12 quarters of earnings data to construct our volatility measures. The 
point estimates for the lead terms are economically tiny and not statistically different from zero, 
suggesting that risk follows parallel trends at treated firms and controls before state income tax 
rate changes. One implication of these findings is that firms do not anticipate future changes in 
state income taxes (or if they do, that they wait to change risk until the tax changes affect 
shareholder wealth). This, in turn, lessens concerns regarding potential anticipation effects.  
Table 4 also allows for potential delays in firms’ responses to tax cuts and post-shock 
reversals in the effect of tax increases by including three-year lags. The coefficient for lagged tax 
increases is negative, indicating that firms do not subsequently reverse the reduction in risk 
following a tax increase. Given the relatively large point estimate, the effect of a tax increase 
appears not only persistent but also increasing over time. In column 1, the cumulative effect is -
0.035 (p<0.001), suggesting that a one-percentage-point increase in the state corporate income 
tax rate in year t reduces ROA volatility by 3.5% over the next six years (i.e., ROA volatility 
measured over years t to t+2 and over years t+3 to t+5). Given an average tax increase of 136 
basis points, the average treated firm thus reduces its risk by a cumulative 4.8%. For tax cuts, the 
coefficient on the lag term is economically small and statistically insignificant. 
3.2.2 Local business cycle effects and other state-level confounds 
What might be called “local shocks” are a standard challenge to research designs that exploit 
local policy changes. A priori, there is little reason to expect tax changes to be “exogenous” 
rather than to occur in response to local shocks. The identification concern then is that changes in 
local economic conditions coincide with, or even drive, state changes in tax rates, and that it is 
these changes in local economic conditions – rather than the tax changes – that cause firms to 
change their risk taking. 
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We next present tests designed to deal with local shocks of three different types: (a) observed 
or unobserved changes in local economic conditions that coincide with state tax changes and 
whose effects diffuse across state borders, and either (b) observed or (c) unobserved changes in 
economic policies that coincide with state tax changes and whose effects stop at the state border.  
To address local shocks of type (a), we perform a neighboring-state test,19 by dropping far-
away control states, restricting the set of control firms to those located in states bordering the 
treated state, and including neighboring-state-by-year fixed effects to difference away 
unobserved variation in local economic conditions.20 The essence of a neighboring-state test is to 
exploit a policy discontinuity along a geographic boundary under the maintained assumption that 
there exists an unobserved time-varying confound which might bias the treatment effect of 
interest. The aim is to difference away the confound in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of 
the treatment effect. In our setting, the policy in question is a tax change TA in state A which 
applies only in state A but not in neighboring state B (this is the policy discontinuity). The 
outcome variable is the change in risk, R. The potential time-varying confound (denoted by Y) 
could, for example, be business cycle variation.  
The identifying assumption is that YA ≈YB (both states are exposed to roughly the same 
business cycle variation). Under this identifying assumption, (RA|TA, YA) –RB|YB) is a 
consistent estimate of the effect of taxes on risk taking, given that YA −YB ≈ 0, and so the 
unobserved confound can be differenced away using a fixed effect common to states A and B in 
the tax-shock year. Economically speaking, cross-border neighbors establish the counterfactual 
risk-taking response to the local business cycle variation of firms not affected by a tax increase, 
                                                 
19 See Holmes (1998), Huang (2008), Dell (2010), and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). 
20 Note that, in so doing, we drop observations for states that are treated in another year but are not the neighbor of a 
treated state in the current year. 
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and this counterfactual response is then subtracted from the treated firms’ response to the 
treatment. In other words, comparing treated firms to their immediate neighbors helps ensure that 
trends are parallel after removing the effects (if any) of common variation in local conditions.21 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the results. Compared to firms in neighboring states, 
treated firms reduce both ROA volatility and ROIC volatility by 2.5% (p=0.016 in column 1 and 
p=0.037 in column 2) in response to a one-percentage-point increase in the corporate tax rate. 
Thus, controlling for unobserved local shocks increases the point estimates a little compared to 
the Table 2 baseline. Tax cuts continue to have no effect on risk taking. Overall, these patterns 
confirm that our findings are not driven by unobserved variation that coincides with the tax 
changes but diffuses across state borders.  
A related threat to identification is that there could be an interaction between time-varying 
local conditions and a state’s time-invariant policies. Say states A and B are exposed to the same 
business cycle variation but state A is a business-friendly state while state B believes in heavy 
regulation. Then firms in state A will be more sensitive to the common business cycle variation 
than firms in state B. This, in turn, would violate a version of the identifying assumption, namely 
that absent the tax change in state A, RA|YA ≈RB|YB. In this scenario, our test would 
wrongly attribute the difference in risk taking, (RA|TA, YA) –RB|YB), to the tax change 
rather than to the moderating effect on YB of state B’s heavy regulatory burden.  
For such an interaction between time-varying local conditions and time-invariant policies to 
spuriously produce our results, it would have to be the case that firms’ risk choices were 
systematically more sensitive to changes in economic conditions in tax-increasing states than in 
neighboring control states. We view this as unlikely for two reasons. First, while it is conceivable 
                                                 
21 The neighboring-state test does not assume that neighboring states have the same or similar policies. Assume 
there is variation in policies across neighboring states. If these policies do not themselves change at the time of the 
tax change, they are differenced away by our first-difference research design and so cannot confound the results. 
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that a particular constellation of policy differences across neighboring states and local conditions 
could produce this identification challenge in some place at some point in our data, it is much 
less likely to systematically confound our results, given that we exploit not one but 113 tax 
changes that are neither clustered in time nor in space. Second, the large number of tax changes 
means that every state (bar Montana) that is treated at some time also acts as a control state at 
some other time in our panel. The effects of cross-state differences in the sensitivity of risk 
taking to local conditions thus cancel out.22,23  
This leaves confounds whose variation coincides with the tax changes and whose influence 
stops at the state border. Some of these are observable, others unobservable. Prominent potential 
confounds of the observable variety include the state-level policy changes listed in Appendix A. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 control for changes in state taxes on bank profits and in investment 
incentive programs (i.e., tax credits for investment, R&D, and job creation), some of which 
coincide with corporate tax changes. Doing so increases the estimated effect of tax increases by 
around a third (from -0.025 to around -0.033). The effect of tax cuts remains statistically 
insignificant, and the difference between the sensitivities to tax cuts and tax increases is 
economically large and statistically significant (p=0.007 in column 3 and p=0.021 in column 4).  
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) propose dealing with confounds of the unobservable variety 
by estimating the degree of selection on observables and using it as a guide to the degree of 
selection on unobservables. In our context, this entails gauging the potentially confounding role 
of state-level political and economic conditions that may affect state tax policy. As a first step, 
                                                 
22 If risk-taking in business-friendly state A always responds to the business cycle while risk-taking in state B does 
not, then the treatment effect is (A–B) when A is treated and (B–A) when B is treated, so that the overall treatment 
effect averages zero (i.e., (A–B)+(B–A)=0). Our results reject this null hypothesis, at least for tax increases. 
23 A related concern is that tax changes in one state may trigger changes in the behavior of firms in a neighboring 
state. To investigate such cross-border spillovers, we conduct a test in the spirit of Table 5 that restricts the set of 
control firms to those located in states not neighboring the treated state. As Table A.6 in the Online Appendix shows, 
our inferences are unchanged. 
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columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 include the main determinants of state tax changes as identified by 
Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). This increases the estimated sensitivity to tax increases further, to 
3.6% (p=0.012) for ROA volatility and 4.1% (p=0.006) for ROIC volatility. The effect of tax cuts 
on risk taking continues to be economically small and statistically insignificant.  
In the next step, we follow Christensen et al. (2016) who propose a falsification test of the 
potential bias induced by selection on unobservables. The test regresses the part of the outcome 
variable that is related to observed determinants of the suspected confounds (here: the change in 
risk taking predicted from our economic and political controls) on the treatment variable (here: 
the change in the tax rate). A small coefficient in the falsification test, compared to the estimated 
treatment effect in the baseline test, suggests that the baseline treatment effect is unlikely to 
reflect unobserved confounds. As Table A.7 in the Online Appendix shows, the point estimates 
in the falsification test are tiny and statistically insignificant. These results reinforce our 
conclusion that unobserved variation in local conditions is unlikely to be severe in our setting. 
3.2.3 Anticipation effects 
If firms plan their current policies based on the tax rates they expect to face in the future, 
their observed responses to an actual tax change may not uncover the causal effect of taxes on 
their behavior. To see why, consider a tax increase that turns out smaller than expected. This 
may cause corporate policy to change in a way normally expected after a tax cut (since the tax 
rate increased by less than expected), which in turn would confound the interpretation of the 
observed treatment effect (as the econometrician does not observe the firm’s expectations). 
Having said that, the absence of significant lead effects in Table 4, discussed earlier, suggests 
that firms do not change risk in anticipation of future tax changes. 
As Hennessy and Strebulaev (2015) note, anticipation effects only undermine identification if 
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the corporate policy in question is subject to adjustment costs, so that the firm must plan ahead in 
order to reach its desired position over time given its expectations. The next subsection explores 
empirically various mechanisms by which firms may change risk taking in response to tax 
changes. Some of these are more plausibly subject to adjustment costs than others. The one that 
we find to be strongest in the data is a short-term mechanism with few obvious adjustment costs. 
There is one (somewhat obvious) scenario, besides the absence of adjustment costs, for when 
anticipation effects do not pose an identification challenge: if policy changes are unanticipated. 
More formally, a necessary and sufficient condition for correct inference about causal effects is 
that the policy variable is a Martingale (Hennessy and Strebulaev 2015), which in our context 
means that state tax rates follow a random walk. Using three unit root tests, Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky (2016) largely fail to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk.24  
Specifically, in separate augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on each state’s time series of tax rates 
from 1969 to 2013, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2016) fail to reject the presence of a unit root in 
each state and DC, suggesting corporate tax rates follow a random walk in every state. Realizing 
that some states condition their tax policy on the tax policies of their neighbors (Heider and 
Ljungqvist 2015), Ljungqvist and Smolyansky also test the null hypothesis that each state in a 
given regional “cluster” has a unit root while allowing for cross-sectional dependence in tax rates 
across states. Clusters are defined either as a state and its contiguous neighbors (giving 49 
clusters, including DC’s but excluding Alaska and Hawaii) or as states that are located in a given 
Census region. The null cannot be rejected at standard significance levels except in Connecticut 
and in Massachusetts and their respective contiguous neighbors. Within Census regions, the null 
is never rejected at the 5% level; it is rejected at the 10% level in New England. 
To see whether anticipation effects in states whose tax rates do not follow a random walk 
                                                 
24 These findings echo Barro (1990), who reports that federal taxes follow a random walk.  
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may confound our results, Table 6 excludes firms headquartered in Connecticut or Massachusetts 
(columns 1 and 2 ) or in New England as a whole (columns 3 and 4). Doing so marginally 
reduces the magnitude of the treatment effect of tax increases, to between -0.014 and -0.018 
(p<0.05). Tax cuts continue to have no significant effect on the average firm’s choice of risk. 
An alternative to this econometric way of classifying tax changes as potentially anticipated is 
the “narrative approach” of Romer and Romer (2010). Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) examine the 
political economy events surrounding all state tax changes affecting at least 100 firms since 1989 
to identify potentially anticipated tax changes. Based on their findings, columns 5 and 6 of Table 
6 exclude firms headquartered in Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, or New York (all of which 
experienced sequences of tax cuts). This yields sensitivities to tax increases of between -0.016 
and -0.019 (p<0.05), again marginally smaller than those reported in our baseline tests.  
Collectively, the results in Table 6 suggest that anticipation effects do not play a major role 
in contaminating our findings. This, in turn, increases our confidence in the external validity of 
our findings: to the extent that state tax rates truly follow a random walk, the patterns we 
document should apply more broadly than just in the setting and time period we study.  
3.3 Mechanisms 
By what means do firms reduce risk in response to state corporate income tax increases? The 
reasonably fast reduction in earnings volatility (measured over the three-year period from t to t+2) 
suggests that firms change the risk profile of their existing operations. One way to do so is to 
make changes to the operating cycle: the process by which cash is transformed into raw materials, 
work in progress, finished goods, accounts receivable, and eventually back into cash. Shortening 
the operating cycle (for example, by reducing the amount of cash tied up in inventory that could 
go unsold) puts less capital at risk and so reduces earnings volatility. Essentially, the firm can 
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reduce its operating risk by reducing its investment in working capital, and it can do so relatively 
quickly and, potentially, without incurring substantial adjustments. 
Panel A of Table 7 provides evidence of such reductions in operating risk. In the year 
following a tax increase, we see firms reducing their operating cycles by an average of 1.7 days 
and 3.05 days for every one percentage-point increase in their home-state or nexus-weighted tax 
rate, respectively. (Tax cuts have no effect on operating cycles.) Relative to the sample average 
operating cycle of 83.6 days, this implies a reduction of 2% to 3.6% for the average treated firm. 
About half of this reduction comes from a reduction in inventory holding periods, which fall by 
an average of 0.72 to 1.47 days in columns 2 and 5.25  
Another way firms could reduce operating risk is by reducing operating leverage, that is, the 
sensitivity of profits to changes in output. In practice, reducing operating leverage requires 
turning fixed costs into variable costs. Whether the tax shocks are on average large enough to 
justify the expense involved in making costs more flexible is an open question. For example, 
making labor costs more flexible may involve protracted negotiations with unions and increase 
the risk of strikes (a form of adjustment cost). As columns 3 and 6 of Panel A show, we fail to 
find evidence of firms changing their operating leverage in response to state tax changes.26,27 
Given the further reduction in risk taking observed over the medium term (i.e., the three-year 
period t+3 to t+5 in Table 4), firms may also change the risk profiles of their investment projects. 
Panel B of Table 7 begins by showing that firms do not adjust the level of their capital 
                                                 
25 Though not shown to conserve space, the two other components of the operating cycle, the average number of 
days to collect receivables and pay payables, do not change significantly.  
26 Another way firms can fine-tune their risk profiles in response to state tax rate changes is hedging (Graham and 
Smith 1999; Graham and Rogers 2002). Data on hedging activities are not systematically available. 
27 Table A.8 in the Online Appendix reports two robustness tests. The first restricts the set of control firms to those 
located in neighboring states, following Table 5. This reduces the effect of tax increases on changes in operating 
cycles somewhat, though the effect remains both economically and statistically significant. The second shows that 
firms do not change their operating risk in response to a tax cut, regardless of their financial leverage (coded as in 
Table 3), possibly because doing so would reduce operational efficiency.  
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expenditures or R&D spending in response to state tax changes: the tax sensitivity of either is 
both economically and statistically zero, consistent with Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist 
(2015).28 This finding leaves open the possibility that firms instead respond to tax increases by 
changing project risk. For example, firms may choose safer R&D projects (say, to enhance the 
quality or variety of their existing products) over riskier ones (say, to invent new products).  
Project risk is not directly observable, but its effect on cash flows is potentially measurable. 
To see how, start from the observation that R&D has an asymmetric effect on sales: all else equal, 
successful R&D projects boost the firm’s sales while failed R&D projects have no (immediate) 
effect. This insight gets around the problem that accounting data reveal only R&D inputs (i.e., 
spending), not R&D outputs (i.e., new products or processes that generate sales): an increase in 
the sensitivity of sales to R&D spend implies an increase in R&D outputs for a given amount of 
R&D spend. Next, consider a mean-preserving increase in R&D risk. This would increase the 
sensitivity of sales to R&D spend if the project succeeds and leave it unchanged if the project 
fails. On average, therefore, an increase in R&D risk results in an increase in the sensitivity of 
sales to R&D spend. The opposite holds for a reduction in R&D risk. 
Using a measure called the Research QuotientTM (available on WRDS), Panel B shows that 
the sensitivity of sales to R&D spend falls after a tax increase, consistent with firms reducing 
R&D risk. The effect is not immediate – it takes on average between one and three years for a 
tax increase to reduce the R&D sensitivity of sales – and not overly strong statistically.  
A cautious interpretation of the findings in Table 7 is that the most prominent mechanism by 
which firms reduce risk in response to state corporate income tax increases involves making 
changes to the operating cycle. Since such changes should be relatively easy to reverse, they 
                                                 
28 As Table A.9 in the Online Appendix shows, we similarly find no evidence that firms change their M&A 
activities or reduce risk by engaging in diversifying acquisitions.  
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should not involve substantial adjustment costs, reducing concerns about anticipation effects that 
are not already allayed by Ljungqvist and Smolyansky’s (2016) finding that state tax rates mostly 
follow a random walk or by the auxiliary evidence reported in our previous subsection.  
3.4 Robustness Tests 
Before turning our attention to the moderating effect of tax loss-offset rules, we briefly 
consider two robustness tests. 
Our baseline tests use ROA volatility and ROIC volatility to measure firm risk. Prior research 
on corporate risk taking often uses stock return volatility to measure a firm’s choice of risk. 
Table A.10 in the Online Appendix shows that our findings are robust to using equity volatility 
instead of earnings volatility: a firm’s annual stock return volatility falls by around 2% following 
a tax increase and is invariant to tax cuts, and the difference between the two tax sensitivities is 
economically large and statistically significant.  
Our results may be driven by tax-related changes in earnings management.29 To investigate 
this concern, we test if a firm’s performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, 
and Wasley 2005) vary with tax changes, but find no evidence that they do (see Table A.11 in 
the Online Appendix). This is consistent with Graham’s (2006) observation that “tax incentives 
appear to be a second-order consideration, rather than a dominant influence on earnings 
management” (p. 663). In addition, equity-based measures of risk taking, such as those modeled 
in Table A.10, are not affected by earnings management, further alleviating this concern. 
4. State Tax Loss-Offset Rules 
4.1 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
According to Domar and Musgrave’s (1944) theory, the effect of personal income taxes on 
                                                 
29 Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992) find that firms respond to anticipated reductions in federal tax rates by 
delaying recognizing income. Maydew (1997) provides evidence that firms shift income to benefit from loss-offsets. 
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individual risk taking is negative in the absence of loss-offsets. The same is true in the corporate 
arena. However, if firms can offset losses against past or future profits, the effect of taxes on risk 
taking becomes more complex. On the one hand, income taxes discourage risk taking by 
reducing the per-unit benefit of risk taking. On the other hand, loss-offset rules essentially make 
the government shoulder part of the losses. Thus, both the benefit of risk taking and the level of 
after-tax cash flow risk are reduced. If complete offset of losses is possible, variation in tax rates 
may have no net effect on risk taking.  
To test this prediction, we partition the sample based on the carryback and carryforward rules 
in effect in each firm’s home state in a given fiscal year. Specifically, we code firms as having a 
low ability to offset losses when their home state allows no loss carrybacks and no more than 10 
years of loss carryforwards. Otherwise, we code firms as having a high ability to offset losses.30  
Table 8 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1) in the partitioned samples. For firms with a 
low loss-offset ability, the sensitivity of ROA volatility and ROIC volatility to a tax increase is -
0.026 (p=0.010 in column 1) and -0.033 (p=0.008 in column 3), respectively. For firms with a 
high loss-offset ability, the sensitivity is -0.010 (p=0.391 in column 2) and -0.004 (p=0.817 in 
column 4), respectively.31 These results suggest that the negative effect of tax increases on risk 
taking is largely driven by firms located in states with weak loss-offset provisions, consistent 
with the prediction that the effect of corporate income taxes on risk taking is attenuated by the 
ability to offset tax losses against past or future profits. 
4.2 State Loss-offset Rules and Risk Taking 
Our baseline tests investigate firms’ responses to tax rate changes while our tests of 
heterogeneous treatment effects examine if firms’ responses to tax rate changes are moderated by 
                                                 
30 These cutoffs are arbitrary but, as Table A.12 in the Online Appendix shows, not selective. 
31 The difference between the coefficients on magnitude of tax increase in the two subsamples, although 
economically large, is only statistically significant when we use ROIC volatility as the dependent variable. 
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tax loss-offset rules. We next test if changes in loss-offset rules affect risk taking independently. 
A reduction in the number of years that losses can be carried back or forward essentially reduces 
the extent to which the government shares in a firm’s risks, analogous to a tax rate increase. Thus, 
we expect that reductions in the generosity of carryback or carryforward rules lead to lower risk 
taking. The opposite argument can be made for an increase in the length of carryback or 
carryforward periods (subject to creditors constraining firms’ ability to increase risk). 
Table 9 examines loss-offset rule changes both in a firm’s home state (in Panel A) and across 
its nexus states (in Panel B).32 We allow for asymmetric responses by separately including 
increases and reductions in the length of loss carryback or carryforward periods. For both home-
state and nexus-weighted changes, and whether we model risk as ROA volatility or ROIC 
volatility, we find an asymmetric response to changes in carryback rules: firms reduce risk taking 
as carryback rules are made less generous but do not respond when the rules become more 
generous.33 Since a shorter carryback period amounts to a tax increase, these patterns are 
consistent with our baseline finding that firms reduce risk taking in response to an increased tax 
burden but do not significantly increase risk taking in response to a reduced tax burden.  
The response to changes in carryforward rules is different: firms respond to more generous 
carryforward rules by increasing risk (sometimes significantly so). However, these effects are 
economically small. Firms do not respond when carryforward rules become less generous.  
The contrast between firms’ risk-reducing response to less generous carryback rules and their 
indifference to less generous carryforward rules is consistent with claims in the literature that 
                                                 
32 For the latter, we estimate nexus-weighted changes in the length of tax loss carryback/carryforward periods using 
Eq. (2) (i.e., the formula used to estimate nexus-weighted changes in tax rates), after replacing tax rate changes with 
changes in the length of loss carryback/carryforward periods. 
33 The results are stronger for nexus-weighted changes than for home-state changes. They are robust to controlling 
for the tax rate changes from our baseline tests (see columns 3 and 4). This is not surprising: as Appendix A shows, 
changes in state corporate income tax rates rarely coincide with changes in state tax loss-offset rules. 
  
 
30
carrybacks allow firms to claim cash taxes back immediately when incurring losses whereas the 
benefit of carryforwards is more uncertain (Langenmayr and Lester 2015). 
Overall, using changes in state tax loss-offset rules yields results that reinforce our 
conclusion from using tax-rate changes that increasing a firm’s tax burden reduces its 
willingness to take risk.  
5. Conclusions 
We ask whether and how corporate income taxes affect firms’ risk taking. Based on theories 
of the effect of personal income taxes on individual risk taking, we predict a negative effect of 
corporate taxes on corporate risk taking. Using staggered changes in corporate tax rates across 
U.S. states, we provide evidence that firms reduce risk when tax rates increase, by shortening 
their operating cycles and by reducing the risks they take in their R&D projects. The effect of tax 
increases on risk taking is largely driven by firms located in states with few loss-offset 
opportunities, as theory would have predicted. Consistent with the interpretation that creditors 
use restrictive covenants to prevent firms from increasing risk ex post, we show that only firms 
with low financial leverage increase risk in response to tax cuts.  
In addition to using a difference-in-differences regression with a comprehensive set of firm-
level and state-level control variables, we employ a battery of refinements to establish causality: 
including industry-by-year fixed effects to control for time-varying industry shocks, adding lead 
terms to confirm parallel trends, using neighboring states to control for local shocks, and 
controlling for other coincident state-level policy changes. Of course, the extent to which our 
evidence can be viewed as causal will depend on the severity of any remaining identification 
concerns. 
As in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), an important caveat concerns the external validity of our 
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findings. The state-level tax changes in our sample are generally small in magnitude, and it is 
possible that firms would respond differently if the tax shocks were larger.  The relatively small 
magnitude of our tax changes may also be the reason why we do not see firms adjusting their 
long-term investment decisions in response to state tax changes. 
We end with a brief discussion of potential policy implications. While raising taxes can 
increase the government’s revenue, it may have the side effect of dulling risk-taking incentives 
in the corporate sector, which in turn may adversely affect innovation and economic growth. 
Moreover, if the government wishes to encourage risk taking, our findings suggest that merely 
reducing tax rates is unlikely to be effective without other policy changes.  
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Appendix A. Coincident State-Level Changes. 
 
Panel A. Coincident State-Level Changes for Tax Rate Changes. 
This table reports state-level changes in economic quantities that coincide with either increases or cuts in state 
corporate income taxes and that have a plausible basis in theory to potentially affect corporate risk-taking decisions. 
We focus on changes in state taxes on banks and changes in state investment incentive programs (i.e., tax credits for 
investment, R&D, and job creation, as well as job creation grant programs). We also report state-level changes in the 
length of tax loss carryback/carryforward periods that coincide with state tax rate changes. For variable definitions 
and details of their construction, see Appendix B. 
 
   
Tax 
increases   
Tax 
cuts 
          
Number of tax changes  40 73 
    
… of which coincide with increase in length of state carryback periods 1  3 
 cut in length of state carryback periods 0  2 
     
 increase in length of state carryforward periods 0  4 
 cut in length of state carryforward periods 1  2 
     
 increase in state tax on banks 28 0 
 cut in state tax on banks 0 56 
    
 increase in state investment tax credit rate 1 6 
 cut in state investment tax credit rate 0 0 
    
 increase in state R&D credit rate 2 9 
 cut in state R&D credit rate 1 2 
    
 increase in state job creation credit  0 3 
 cut in state job creation credit 0 1 
    
 increase in state job creation grants 0 1 
 cut in state job creation grants 0 0 
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Panel B. Coincident State-Level Changes for Tax Loss Carryback Changes. 
This table reports state-level changes in economic quantities that coincide with either increases or cuts in the number 
of periods a state allows a company to carry back losses and that have a plausible basis in theory to potentially affect 
corporate risk-taking decisions. We focus on changes in state taxes on banks and changes in state investment 
incentive programs (i.e., tax credits for investment, R&D, and job creation, as well as job creation grant programs). 
For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. 
 
   
Increases in 
carrybacks    
Cuts in 
carrybacks  
          
Number of carryback changes  15  36 
     
… of which coincide with increase in state tax on banks 1  0 
 cut in state tax on banks 0  0 
     
 increase in state investment tax credit rate 2  1 
 cut in state investment tax credit rate 0  0 
     
 increase in state R&D credit rate 0  2 
 cut in state R&D credit rate 0  0 
     
 increase in state job creation credit  2  0 
 cut in state job creation credit 0  0 
     
 increase in state job creation grants 0  0 
 cut in state job creation grants 0  0 
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Panel C. Coincident State-Level Changes for Tax Loss Carryforward Changes. 
This table reports state-level changes in economic quantities that coincide with either increases or cuts in the number 
of periods a state allows a company to carry forward losses and that have a plausible basis in theory to potentially 
affect corporate risk-taking decisions. We focus on changes in state taxes on banks and changes in state investment 
incentive programs (i.e., tax credits for investment, R&D, and job creation, as well as job creation grant programs). 
For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. 
 
   
Increases in 
carryforwards    
Cuts in 
carryforwards 
          
Number of carryforward changes  47 10 
    
… of which coincide with increase in state tax on banks 1 0 
 cut in state tax on banks 3 1 
    
 increase in state investment tax credit rate 3 1 
 cut in state investment tax credit rate 0 0 
    
 increase in state R&D credit rate 2 2 
 cut in state R&D credit rate 0 0 
    
 increase in state job creation credit  2 0 
 cut in state job creation credit 1 0 
    
 increase in state job creation grants 0 0 
 cut in state job creation grants 0 0 
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
ROA volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the difference between quarterly ROA and ROA for the same 
quarter of the previous year, computed over a three-year period t to t+2 (requiring a minimum of four quarters of 
data). ROA (return on assets) is defined as operating income after depreciation (Compustat item oiadpq) over the 
book value of assets (Compustat item atq). We annualize ROA volatility by multiplying it by 4 . 
 
ROIC volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the difference between quarterly ROIC and ROIC for the same 
quarter of the previous year, computed over a three-year period t to t+2 (requiring a minimum of four quarters of 
data). ROIC (return on invested capital) is defined as operating income after depreciation (Compustat item oiadpq) 
over the sum of debt (Compustat items dlttq + dlcq), minority interests (Compustat item mibtq), preferred stock 
(pstkq) and common stock (ceqq). We annualize ROIC volatility by multiplying it by 4 . 
 
Operating cycle is defined as the sum of the average inventory holding period and the average number of days to 
collect receivables minus the average number of days to pay payables. The average inventory holding period is 
computed as average inventory (Compustat item invt) over cost of goods sold (Compustat item cogs), multiplied by 
365. The average number of days to collect receivables is computed as average accounts receivable (Compustat item 
rect) over sales (Compustat item sale), multiplied by 365. The average number of days to pay payables is computed 
as average accounts payable (Compustat item ap) over purchases (cost of goods sold + ending inventory – beginning 
inventory), multiplied by 365.  
 
Days inventory is defined as the average inventory holding period, computed as average inventory (Compustat item 
invt) over cost of goods sold (Compustat item cogs), multiplied by 365. 
 
Operating leverage is measured as the sensitivity of EBIT to sales (Mandelker and Rhee 1984). Specifically, it is 
estimated as the coefficient on the logarithm of quarterly sales in a firm-specific regression that regresses the 
logarithm of quarterly operating income after depreciation (Compustat item oiadpq) on the logarithm of quarterly 
sales (Compustat item saleq) over a three-year period from t to t+2 (requiring a minimum of four quarters of data).  
 
Capex is defined as net capital expenditure (Compustat item capx – sppe) over the book value of assets (Compustat 
item at). 
 
R&D is defined as research and development expenditure (Compustat item xrd) over the book value of assets 
(Compustat item at). Following standard practice, we set xrd equal to zero when it is missing from Compustat. 
 
RQ (short for research quotient) is a firm-year measure of the output elasticity of R&D (Knott 2008), obtained from 
the WRDS RQTM database. It represents the percentage increase in revenues (in year t+1) resulting from a 1% 
increase in R&D (in year t), when other inputs and their elasticities are held constant.  
 
Independent variables: Firm characteristics  
 
Firm age is defined as the Compustat age. 
 
Firm size is defined as the book value of total assets (Compustat item at) in year 2009 real dollars (deflated using the 
GDP deflator available at http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls). 
 
Market/book is defined as the ratio of the market value of equity (Compustat items prcc_f × csho) to the book value 
of equity (Compustat item ceq). 
 
Book leverage is defined as long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) over the book value of assets (Compustat item at). 
 
Cash surplus is defined as cash from assets-in-place (Compustat items oancf – dpc + xrd) over the book value of 
assets (Compustat item at). 
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Loss carryforward is an indicator set equal to one if the firm has positive net operating loss carryforward (Compustat 
item tlcf), and zero otherwise. 
 
Sales growth is defined as the log of current year sales over last year sales (Compustat item sale). 
 
Stock return is defined as cumulated monthly returns over the 12-month period ending at the fiscal year end 
(measured using data from CRSP). 
 
Independent variables: State-level characteristics 
 
GSP growth rate is the real annual growth rate in gross state product (GSP) using data obtained from the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. 
 
State unemployment rate is the state unemployment rate, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
State tax on banks captures changes in the rate at which a state taxes financial institutions with nexus to the state. 
(Both a physical presence in the state and out-of-state lending to borrowers located in the state constitute nexus.) 
The data come from the Book of the States and state codes accessed through Lexis-Nexis. 
 
State investment tax credit rate is the rate at which a firm can deduct capital expenditures directly from its state 
corporate income tax liability (in addition to the usual depreciation deductions against taxable income). Data 
through 2006 come from Chirinko and Wilson (2008). Data for subsequent years come from tax forms available on 
state Department of Revenue websites. 
 
State R&D credit rate is the percentage of a firm’s R&D expenditures that it can deduct directly from its state 
corporate income tax liability (in addition to the usual deduction against taxable income). Data through 2006 come 
from Wilson (2009). Data for subsequent years come from tax forms available on state Department of Revenue 
websites. 
 
State job creation credit is set equal to one if the state offers a tax credit in return for hiring new workers meeting 
certain requirements, and zero otherwise. The data come from Appendix A1 in Neumark and Grijalva (2015).  
 
State job creation grants is set equal to one if the state offers grant payments in return for hiring new workers 
meeting certain requirements, and zero otherwise. The data come from Appendix A1 in Neumark and Grijalva 
(2015). 
 
Democratic governor is an indicator set equal to one if the state is governed by a Democratic governor, and zero 
otherwise. Data come from the Congressional Quarterly (through 2008) and state election websites (after 2008). 
 
State budget balance equals the difference between a state’s general revenues and its general expenditures scaled 
by its general expenditures. The data come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s State & Local Finances database, 
available at http://www.census.gov/govs/local.  
 
State bond rating downgrade is an indicator set equal to one if the state’s credit rating is downgraded by either 
Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.  
 
State union penetration is the fraction of private-sector employees in a state who belong to a labor union in year t. 
The data come from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) as updated on their website, http://www.unionstats.com. 
 
Tax competition is measured as the difference between a state’s corporate income tax rate and the highest corporate 
income tax rate levied by any of the neighboring states.  
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Table 1. Firm-Level Summary Statistics. 
The sample consists of 64,447 firm-years for all non-financial and non-utility U.S. companies that are traded on the 
NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq in fiscal years 1990 through 2011, as per the merged CRSP-Compustat Fundamentals 
Annual database. The table reports summary statistics for our dependent variables and the controls. For variable 
definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. All variables are winsorized 1% in each tail. 
 
   percentile 
  mean s.d. 25th 50th 75th 
      
Dependent variables      
   ROA volatility (in %) 6.8 11.0 2.3 3.8 7.2 
   ROIC volatility (in %) 10.6 17.2 3.1 5.3 10.2 
   operating cycle 83.6 96.1 32.2 73.3 125.7 
   days inventory 75.7 76.8 12.9 59.7 108.7 
   operating leverage 2.5 3.6 0.9 1.8 3.4 
   capex (in %) 5.4 6.1 1.7 3.6 6.9 
   R&D (in %) 5.3 11.8 0.0 0.1 5.9 
   RQ 10.0 5.4 7.5 10.0 12.6 
      
State characteristics      
   GSP growth rate (in %) 2.7 2.6 1.1 2.7 4.2 
   state unemployment rate (in %) 5.9 1.9 4.6 5.5 6.9 
      
Firm characteristics      
   firm age 19.6 13.3 9.0 15.0 27.0 
   firm size (total assets, $m) 1,755.2 4,899.7 52.6 219.2 969.3 
   market/book 3.0 4.7 1.1 1.9 3.3 
   book leverage 0.162 0.179 0.002 0.111 0.267 
   cash surplus 0.035 0.199 -0.012 0.050 0.115 
   loss carryforward 0.363 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 
   sales growth 0.052 0.339 -0.057 0.050 0.166 
   stock return 0.166 0.744 -0.251 0.040 0.375 
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Table 2. Effect of Tax Changes on Firm Risk. 
We estimate OLS regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their risk profile in response to 
changes in state corporate income taxes. The dependent variable change in log ROA (or ROIC) volatility is defined as 
the difference between log ROA (or ROIC) volatility at t (i.e., computed over t to t+2) and log ROA (or ROIC) 
volatility at t–3 (i.e., computed over t–3 to t–1). For variable definitions and details of their construction, see 
Appendix B. In columns 1 and 2, we use contemporaneous changes in the firm’s home-state top marginal corporate 
income tax rate. In columns 3 and 4, we use lagged changes in the firm’s home-state top marginal corporate income 
tax rate. Columns 5 and 6 use the contemporaneous nexus-weighted change in tax rates as defined in Eq. (2). The 
unit of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to 
remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry 
shocks. The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the 
state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for 
equal tax sensitivity (tax increase = -tax cut) is one-sided. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
magnitude of tax increase  -0.019*** -0.020***     
 0.007 0.007     
magnitude of tax cut 0.016 0.018     
 0.016 0.015     
lagged tax increase    -0.026*** -0.019**   
   0.007 0.009   
lagged tax cut   0.000 0.000   
   0.015 0.017   
nexus-weighted tax increase     -0.024** -0.032*** 
     0.009 0.011 
nexus-weighted tax cut     0.014 0.017 
     0.024 0.028 
Change in …       
   GSP growth rate -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
   state unemployment rate 0.009** 0.010* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009** 0.009* 
 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
Lagged change in …       
   log firm age -0.526*** -0.556*** -0.526*** -0.553*** -0.527*** -0.556*** 
 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.041 
   log firm size -0.242*** -0.325*** -0.242*** -0.325*** -0.242*** -0.325*** 
 0.018 0.027 0.017 0.027 0.018 0.027 
   log market/book 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.121*** 0.163*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
   book leverage -0.300*** -0.389*** -0.301*** -0.392*** -0.300*** -0.389*** 
 0.032 0.035 0.034 0.037 0.032 0.035 
   cash surplus -0.250*** -0.253*** -0.248*** -0.247*** -0.249*** -0.253*** 
 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 
   loss carryforward 0.018* 0.030*** 0.017* 0.029*** 0.018* 0.030*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
   sales growth 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
   stock return -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.055*** 
 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
       
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 21.3% 21.0% 21.4% 21.1% 21.3% 21.0% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 0.03 0.02 2.03* 0.74 0.17 0.25 
No. of firms 8,046 7,999 8,041 7,994 8,046 7,999 
No. of observations 64,447 64,221 64,435 64,200 64,447 64,221 
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Table 3. Effect of Tax Changes on Risk for Firms with Low or High Leverage. 
To test whether firms are constrained by their lenders from increasing risk in response to a tax cut, we partition the 
sample based on financial leverage (measured as of the end of the fiscal year before a tax change). Columns 1 and 3 
focus on firms with book leverage below the sample median. Columns 2 and 4 focus on firms with book leverage 
above the sample median. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of 
analysis is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-by-year fixed 
effects (not shown for brevity). The tests for equal tax sensitivity across columns 1 and 2 and across columns 3 and 
4 are based on fully-interacted models. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the tests for equal tax 
sensitivity are one-sided. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics 
underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Change in log … 
 ROA volatility  ROIC volatility 
 
Low 
leverage 
High 
leverage  
Low 
leverage 
High 
leverage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
magnitude of tax increase  -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.032** -0.022** 
 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.009 
magnitude of tax cut 0.063*** -0.019 0.072*** -0.019 
 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.023 
     
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 25.6% 31.1% 25.3% 31.1% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F)     
  Tax increases: (1) vs. (2) or (3) vs. (4) 0.03  0.41 
  Tax cuts: (1) vs. (2) or (3) vs. (4) 15.44***  13.91*** 
No. of firms 5,769 5,467  5,723 5,441 
No. of observations 32,223 32,224  32,105 32,106 
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Table 4. Testing for Pre-Trends, Delays, and Post-Event Reversals. 
To investigate possible pre-trends, delays, and reversals, we include lead and lag terms in the baseline regressions 
shown in Table 2, columns 1 and 2. Recall that the change in ROA volatility or ROIC volatility compares earnings 
volatility in the period t to t+2 to earnings volatility in the period t–3 to t–1. Accordingly, we use leads dated t+3 and 
lags dated t–3 to avoid inducing a mechanical correlation between the dependent variable and the lead or lag term. 
For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and 
include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The full set of controls (as in Table 2) and fixed 
effects are included but not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state 
level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) 
      
magnitude of tax increase at t = +3 -0.001 -0.005 
 0.025 0.028 
magnitude of tax increase at t = 0 -0.019** -0.017** 
 0.009 0.008 
magnitude of tax increase at t = –3 -0.016* -0.014 
 0.008 0.008 
   
magnitude of tax cut at t = +3 -0.007 0.007 
 0.011 0.013 
magnitude of tax cut at t = 0 0.018 0.018 
 0.014 0.014 
magnitude of tax cut at t = –3 -0.001 -0.002 
 0.014 0.018 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2 24.4% 23.6% 
No. of firms 6,183 6,171 
No. of observations 47,966 47,879 
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Table 5. Potential Confounds: Local Business Cycle Effects, Other Tax Changes, and Determinants of Tax Rate Changes.  
States may change corporate tax rates, and firms may change their risk profile, in response to unobserved changes in local business conditions. To examine this 
potential confound, we restrict the set of control firms to those located in a neighboring state, thus excluding far-away states (i.e., firms in states that neither 
experience a tax change nor border a state that does are excluded). This means that we drop observations for states that are treated in another year but are not the 
neighbor of a treated state in the current year. This reduces the sample compared to the baseline models shown in Table 2. To address concerns stemming from 
the fact that corporate tax changes occasionally coincide with changes in state taxes on bank profits or in investment incentive programs (i.e., tax credits for 
investment, R&D, and job creation), columns 3 and 4 control explicitly for these concurrent changes. In columns 5 and 6, we further control for local political 
forces and economic conditions that may influence whether a state changes its corporate tax rate (namely, the governor’s political affiliation, the election cycle, 
the state’s budget balance, ratings downgrades, unemployment, growth, union penetration, and tax competition with neighboring states). All specifications are 
estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-by-year fixed effects and group-year fixed effects, where a treated state and its neighboring states are 
coded as a group. The full set of controls (as in Table 2) and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. For variable definitions and details of their 
construction, see Appendix B. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. 
We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for 
equal tax sensitivity (tax increase = -tax cut) is one-sided. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
magnitude of tax increase  -0.025** -0.025** -0.032** -0.034** -0.036** -0.041***
 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 
magnitude of tax cut 0.000 -0.003 -0.013 -0.017 -0.006 -0.010
 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.024 
Other coincident tax changes       
   increase in state tax on banks   0.022 0.033 0.029 0.042* 
   0.025 0.027 0.023 0.025 
   cut in state tax on banks   0.024 0.030 0.022 0.034 
   0.029 0.026 0.032 0.030 
   increase in state investment tax credits   -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
   0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
   cut in state investment tax credits   0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 
   0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
   increase in state R&D tax credits   0.004 0.003 0.005* 0.004* 
   0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
   cut in state R&D tax credits   -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.008** 
   0.006 0.002 0.006 0.003 
   increase in state job tax credits   0.025 0.027 0.020 0.023 
   0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 
   cut in state job tax credits   0.051 0.076 0.064 0.090 
   0.063 0.065 0.062 0.064 
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Political conditions       
   Lagged change in Democratic governor     0.046*** 0.034** 
     0.015 0.015
   =1 if one year to next gubernatorial election     -0.006 -0.014 
     0.018 0.020
   =1 if two years to next gubernatorial election     0.004 0.008 
     0.013 0.014
   =1 if three years to next gubernatorial election     -0.032 -0.034* 
     0.020 0.019
Economic conditions       
   Lagged change in state budget balance     0.120 0.168 
     0.139 0.145
   =1 if state bond rating downgraded in year t–1     -0.017 -0.018 
     0.021 0.023
   Lagged change in GSP growth rate     0.002 0.004 
     0.003 0.003
   Lagged change in state unemployment rate     -0.016* -0.014 
     0.008 0.011
   Lagged change in state union penetration     -0.005 -0.005 
     0.006 0.006
Tax competition        
   Lagged change in state’s tax rate relative to      0.000 0.007* 
   highest tax rate among its neighboring states     0.004 0.004
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 29.0% 28.8% 29.0% 28.8% 29.1% 28.8% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 1.84* 1.44 6.65*** 4.35** 4.16** 3.51** 
No. of firms 6,586 6,547 6,586 6,547 6,586 6,547 
No. of observations 29,613 29,498 29,613 29,498 29,613 29,498 
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Table 6. Anticipation Effects. 
If state tax rate changes are anticipated, measured treatment responses to realized tax rate changes may not capture 
causal effects (Hennessy and Strebulaev 2015). To address this concern, we exclude firms headquartered in states 
whose tax rate changes are likely to be anticipated. Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2015) test whether state tax rates 
follow a Martingale (which implies that changes in tax rates are unpredictable). Based on their findings, columns 1 
and 2 exclude firms headquartered in Connecticut or Massachusetts while columns 3 and 4 exclude firms 
headquartered in New England (i.e., Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or 
Vermont). Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) examine the political economy events surrounding all state tax changes 
affecting at least 100 firms, using a “narrative approach” to identify potentially anticipated tax changes. Based on 
their findings, columns 5 and 6 exclude firms headquartered in Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, or New York. For 
variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis in each column is a firm-
year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels 
equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The full set of controls (as in Table 
2) and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered 
at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
magnitude of tax increase  -0.016** -0.018** -0.014** -0.017** -0.016** -0.019** 
 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 
magnitude of tax cut 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.012 -0.012 -0.009 
 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.014 0.014 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 22.1% 21.9% 22.2% 22.0% 23.3% 23.0% 
No. of firms 7,433 7,391 7,363 7,321 6,685 6,652 
No. of observations 59,130 58,915 58,476 58,263 52,699 52,511 
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Table 7. Effect of Tax Changes on Operational and Investment Choices. 
We estimate OLS regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their operational and investment 
policies in response to changes in state corporate income taxes. Panel A focuses on a firm’s operational choices. The 
dependent variable change in operating cycle (or days inventory) is defined as the difference between operating 
cycle (or days inventory) at time t and operating cycle (or days inventory) at t–1. The dependent variable change in 
operating leverage is defined as the difference between operating leverage at time t (i.e., computed over t to t+2) and 
operating leverage at t–3 (i.e., computed over t–3 to t–1). Panel B focuses on a firm’s investment choices. To 
investigate possible pre-trends, delays, and reversals, we include lead and lag terms in the regressions. The 
dependent variable change in capex (or R&D, RQ) is defined as the difference between capex (or R&D, RQ) at time 
t and capex (or R&D, RQ) at t–1. In both panels, columns 1 to 3 use changes in the firm’s home-state corporate 
income tax rate while columns 4 to 6 use the nexus-weighted change in tax rates as defined in Eq. (2). For variable 
definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and 
include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. We include the same controls and fixed effects as 
in Table 2. These are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state 
level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Effect of Tax Changes on Operational Choices. 
 
 Change in … 
 
operating 
cycle 
days 
inventory 
operating 
leverage 
operating 
cycle 
days 
inventory 
operating 
leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
magnitude of tax increase  -1.702*** -0.724* 0.078    
 0.379 0.375 0.099    
magnitude of tax cut -0.030 -0.246 0.173    
 0.956 0.755 0.135    
nexus-weighted tax increase    -3.052** -1.473** 0.077 
    1.163 0.559 0.177 
nexus-weighted tax cut    -0.787 -0.134 0.158 
    1.431 1.014 0.193 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  10.1% 11.5% 14.9%  10.1% 11.5% 14.9% 
No. of firms 7,952 7,981 6,105 7,952 7,981 6,105 
No. of observations 63,472 63,881 49,707 63,472 63,881 49,707 
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Panel B. Effect of Tax Changes on Investment Choices. 
 
  Change in …  
 capex R&D RQ  capex R&D RQ 
 Home-state tax changes  Nexus-weighted tax changes 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
magnitude of tax increase at t = +1 0.000 0.000 -0.121 0.000 0.001 -0.114 
 0.001 0.001 0.114 0.001 0.001 0.110 
magnitude of tax increase at t = 0 0.000 -0.001 -0.049 -0.001 -0.001 -0.098 
 0.001 0.001 0.089 0.001 0.001 0.113 
magnitude of tax increase at t = –1 0.000 0.000 -0.167* 0.000 0.000 -0.231* 
 0.001 0.000 0.089 0.001 0.001 0.123 
magnitude of tax increase at t = –2 0.000 0.001 -0.085 0.001 0.001 -0.005 
 0.000 0.001 0.099 0.001 0.001 0.109 
magnitude of tax increase at t = –3 0.001 -0.001 -0.155* 0.002 -0.001 -0.231** 
 0.001 0.001 0.081 0.001 0.001 0.113 
       
magnitude of tax cut at t = +1 0.000 0.001 0.126 -0.001 0.002 0.227 
 0.001 0.002 0.130 0.001 0.002 0.169 
magnitude of tax cut at t = 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.058 0.000 -0.004 0.002 
 0.001 0.002 0.122 0.002 0.003 0.128 
magnitude of tax cut at t = –1 0.000 0.002 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.140 
 0.001 0.001 0.117 0.001 0.002 0.133 
magnitude of tax cut at t = –2 0.000 -0.001 -0.016 0.000 -0.002 -0.035 
 0.001 0.001 0.082 0.001 0.002 0.135 
magnitude of tax cut at t = –3 0.001 0.001 -0.146 0.002 0.001 -0.184 
 0.001 0.002 0.117 0.001 0.003 0.144 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 16.7% 8.0% 29.5% 16.7% 8.0% 29.5% 
No. of firms  7,323 7,379 3,771  7,323 7,379 3,771 
No. of observations 57,747 58,498 28,833  57,747 58,498 28,833 
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Table 8. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects. 
Tax loss carryback and carryforward rules dampen the impact of corporate income tax rate changes on firm risk. To 
test this, we partition sample firms based on the tax loss carryback and carryforward rules of their headquarter state. 
Columns 1 and 3 include firms headquartered in a state that (1) does not allow losses to be carried back and (2) does 
not permit losses to be carried forward for more than 10 years. Columns 2 and 4 include only the remaining sample 
firms. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. 
All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-by-year fixed effects (not shown for 
brevity). The tests for equal tax sensitivity across columns 1 and 2 and across columns 3 and 4 are based on fully-
interacted models. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the tests for equal tax sensitivity are one-sided. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the 
coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively.  
 
 Change in log … 
 ROA volatility  ROIC volatility 
 
Low loss  
offset ability 
High loss  
offset ability  
Low loss  
offset ability 
High loss  
offset ability 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
magnitude of tax increase  -0.026** -0.010 -0.033*** -0.004 
 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.016 
magnitude of tax cut 0.009 0.012 0.017 0.014 
 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.019 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 29.8% 26.9% 28.8% 26.8% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F)     
  Tax increases: (1) vs. (2) or (3) vs. (4) 1.18  2.10* 
No. of firms 4,221 5,757  4,203 5,716 
No. of observations 26,005 38,442  25,914 38,297 
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Table 9. Effect of Changes in Loss Carryback/Carryforward Rules on Firm Risk. 
We estimate OLS regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their risk profile in response to 
changes in state tax loss carryback/carryforward rules. Panel A focuses on the change in the number of years a loss 
can be carried back or forward in a firm’s headquarter state. Panel B focuses on the nexus-weighted change in the 
number of years a loss can be carried back or forward in the states a firm has nexus with. Both increases and 
reductions are measured in absolute terms. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. 
The unit of analysis is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm 
fixed effects in the levels equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The full 
set of controls (as in Table 2) and fixed effects are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Reflecting the signed nature of the 
predictions, the test for equal tax sensitivity is one-sided. 
 
Panel A. Home-State Rule Changes. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
increase in length of carryback period  0.016 0.022 0.016 0.022 
 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.016 
reduction in length of carryback period  -0.023*** -0.019** -0.023*** -0.019** 
 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
increase in length of carryforward period  0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
reduction in length of carryforward period  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
magnitude of tax increase   -0.019*** -0.020*** 
   0.007 0.007 
magnitude of tax cut   0.014 0.015 
   0.016 0.016 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 21.3% 21.0% 21.3% 21.0% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F)     
   increase in carryback = -reduction in carryback 0.24 0.03 0.23 0.04 
   increase in carryforward = -reduction in carryforward 4.95** 5.49** 4.03** 4.66**
   reduction in carryback = -increase in carryforward 8.02*** 3.89** 8.21*** 3.93**
No. of firms 8,046 7,999 8,046 7,999 
No. of observations 64,447 64,211 64,447 64,211 
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Panel B. Nexus-Weighted Rule Changes. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
nexus-weighted increase in carryback period  0.025 0.038 0.025 0.038 
 0.024 0.028 0.024 0.028 
nexus-weighted reduction in carryback period  -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.028*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
nexus-weighted increase in carryforward period 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.003* 
 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
nexus-weighted reduction in carryforward period  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
nexus-weighted tax increase   -0.024** -0.031*** 
   0.009 0.011 
nexus-weighted tax cut   0.012 0.015 
   0.024 0.028 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 21.3% 21.0% 21.3% 21.0% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F)     
   increase in carryback = -reduction in carryback 0.22 0.13 0.21 0.15 
   increase in carryforward = -reduction in carryforward 0.52 0.84 0.47 0.76 
   reduction in carryback = -increase in carryforward 10.56*** 5.70** 10.65*** 5.70** 
No. of firms 8,046 7,999 8,046 7,999 
No. of observations 64,447 64,211 64,447 64,211 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
 
 
(NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION) 
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Table A.1. List of Changes in State Corporate Income Tax Rates. 
 
Panel A. List of Tax Increases. 
This table lists all U.S. state corporate income tax increases in calendar years 1989–2012 affecting firms in fiscal 
years 1990-2011. In states with more than one tax bracket, we report the change to the top bracket. Tax changes are 
identified from the Tax Foundation (an abbreviated version of which is available at http://www.taxfoundation.org), 
the Book of the States, a search of the “Current Corporate Income Tax Developments” feature published periodically 
in the Journal of State Taxation, and state tax codes accessed through Lexis-Nexis.  
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample firms 
    
IL 1989 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 4% to 4.8% 6 
KY 1989 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7.25% to 8% 7 
NJ 1989 Introduction of 0.375% tax surcharge 7 
RI 1989 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 9% 7 
CT 1990 Introduction of 20% tax surcharge, increasing top marginal tax rate from 11.5% to 13.8% 64 
MO 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6.5% 34 
MT 1990 Introduction of 5% tax surcharge on tax liability 2 
NE 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6.65% to 7.24% 5 
OK 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6% 27 
AR 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6% to 6.5% 14 
ME 1991 Introduction of 10% tax surcharge on tax liability 3 
NC 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 7.75% and introduction of 4% tax 
surcharge on tax liability 
53 
NE 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7.24% to 7.81% and introduction of 15% tax 
surcharge on tax liability 
9 
PA 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 12.25% 132 
RI 1991 Introduction of 11% tax surcharge on tax liability 12 
DC 1992 Introduction of 2.5% surcharge on tax liability 4 
KS 1992 Increase in top corporate income tax rate (including surcharge) from 6.75% to 7.35% 19 
KY 1992 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 8.25%  9 
MT 1992 Re-introduction of tax surcharge on tax liability at 2.3% rate 1 
MO 1993 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6.25% and reduction in federal income 
tax deductibility from 100% to 50% 
43 
MT 1993 Increase in tax surcharge on tax liability from 2.3% to 4.7% 1 
DC 1994 Introduction of additional 2.5% surcharge on tax liability 1 
VT 1997 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8.25% to 9.75% 7 
NH 1999 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 8% 13 
AL 2001 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6.5% 20 
NH 2001 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 8.5% 13 
KS 2002 Increase in tax surcharge on taxable income from 3.35% to 4.5% 23 
TN 2002 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6% to 6.5% 44 
AR 2003 Introduction of 3% tax surcharge on tax liability 15 
CT 2003 Introduction of 20% tax surcharge on tax liability 77 
IN 2003 Repeal of gross income tax (based on revenue rather than profits) and of supplemental income 
tax; effective adjusted gross income tax rate (on profits) increased from 7.75% to 8.5% 
32 
CT 2004 Increase in tax surcharge on tax liability to 25%  76 
NJ 2006 Introduction of 4% tax surcharge on tax liability 116 
MD 2008 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 8.25% 40 
CT 2009 Introduction of 10% tax surcharge on tax liability for companies with revenues > $100m 39 
NC 2009 Introduction of 3% tax surcharge on tax liability 48 
OR 2009 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6.6% to 7.9% 22 
IL 2011 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 4.8% to 7% 100 
CT 2012 Unscheduled two-year extension of tax surcharge on tax liability and increase to 20% 1 
MI 2012 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 4.95% to 6% 6 
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Panel B. List of Tax Cuts.  
This table lists all U.S. state corporate income tax cuts in calendar years 1989–2012 affecting firms in fiscal years 
1990-2011. In states with more than one tax bracket, we report the change to the top bracket. Tax changes are 
identified from the Tax Foundation (an abbreviated version of which is available at http://www.taxfoundation.org), 
the Book of the States, a search of the “Current Corporate Income Tax Developments” feature published periodically 
in the Journal of State Taxation, and state tax codes accessed through Lexis-Nexis. 
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample firms 
    
CO 1989 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5.5% to 5.4% 68 
WV 1989 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.6% to 9.45% 4 
AZ 1990 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.5% to 9.3% 23 
CO 1990 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5.4% to 5.3% 74 
WV 1990 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.45% to 9.3% 5 
CO 1991 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5.3% to 5.2% 85 
MN 1991 Reduction in the legislated tax increase of 0.4% 117 
MT 1991 Repeal of 5% tax surcharge 2 
WV 1991 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.3% to 9.15% 6 
CO 1992 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5.2% to 5.1% 85 
CT 1992 Reduction in tax surcharge from 20% to 10% 94 
MO 1992 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 6.5% to 5% 41 
NC 1992 Reduction in tax surcharge from 4% to 3% 65 
WV 1992 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.15% to 9% 4 
CO 1993 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5.1% to 5.0% 81 
CT 1993 Repeal of 10% tax surcharge 70 
ME 1993 Repeal of 10% tax surcharge 3 
NC 1993 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3% to 2% 51 
NE 1993 Repeal of 15% tax surcharge 9 
NH 1993 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.5% 9 
AZ 1994 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.3% to 9% 31 
MT 1994 Repeal of 4.7% tax surcharge 1 
NC 1994 Reduction in tax surcharge from 2% to 1% 54 
NH 1994 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.5% to 7% 17 
NJ 1994 Repeal of 0.375% tax surcharge 154 
PA 1994 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 12.25% to 11.99% 135 
RI 1994 Repeal of 11% tax surcharge 9 
CT 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 11.5% to 11.25% 87 
DC 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10% to 9.5% (+2 tax surcharges at 2.5% 
each) 
6 
NC 1995 Repeal of 1% tax surcharge 46 
PA 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 11.99% to 9.99% 144 
CT 1996 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 11.25% to 10.75% 91 
CA 1997 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.3% to 8.84% 554 
CT 1997 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.75% to 10.5% 89 
NC 1997 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.75% to 7.5% 65 
AZ 1998 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9% to 8% 44 
CT 1998 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.5% to 9.5% 84 
NC 1998 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.5% to 7.25% 59 
CO 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 4.75% 91 
CT 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.5% to 8.5% 77 
NC 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.25% to 7% 46 
NY 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9% to 8.5% 265 
OH 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.9% to 8.5% 132 
AZ 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.968% 49 
CO 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 4.75% to 4.63% 80 
CT 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 7.5% 72 
NC 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 6.9% 61 
NY 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 8% 262 
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AZ 2001 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.968% to 6.968% 40 
ID 2001 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.6% 7 
NY 2001 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.5% 244 
KS 2003 Reduction in tax surcharge from 4.5% to 3.35% 22 
ND 2004 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.5% to 7% 1 
AR 2005 Repeal of 3% tax surcharge 14 
KY 2005 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.25% to 7% 18 
OH 2005 Tax reform phasing out corp. income tax while phasing in gross receipts tax over period of 5 
years 
90 
CT 2006 Reduction in tax surcharge from 25% to 20% 64 
VT 2006 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.75% to 8.9% 2 
NY 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.5% to 7.1% 197 
VT 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.9% to 8.5% 2 
WV 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9% to 8.75% 3 
CT 2008 Repeal of 20% tax surcharge 63 
KS 2008 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3.35% to 3.1% 12 
KY 2008 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 6% 16 
KS 2009 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3.1% to 3.05% 13 
WV 2009 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.75% to 8.5% 3 
MA 2010 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.5% to 8.75% 134 
NJ 2010 Repeal of 4% tax surcharge 85 
KS 2011 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3.05% to 3% 11 
MA 2011 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.75% to 8.25% 123 
NC 2011 Repeal of 3% tax surcharge 36 
ND 2011 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 6.4% to 5.4% 1 
OR 2011 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.9% to 7.6% 18 
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Table A.2. List of Changes in State Tax Loss Carryback/Carryforward Rules. 
 
Panel A. List of Loss Carryback Period Increases.  
This table lists all state-level increases in the length of tax loss carryback periods affecting firms in fiscal years 
1990-2011. Tax loss carryback period changes are identified from the Book of the States.  
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample firms 
    
DC 1991 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 3 years 7 
ME 1991 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 3 years 3 
MS 1992 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 1 year 7 
MS 1993 Increase in loss carryback period from 1 to 2 years 7 
VT 1993 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 3 years 4 
MS 1994 Increase in loss carryback period from 2 to 3 years 6 
AL 1995 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 3 years 21 
VT 1998 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 2 years 8 
NY 1999 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 2 years 282 
AK 2002 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 2 years 2 
LA 2002 Increase in loss carryback period from 2 to 3 years 23 
OK 2002 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 2 years 23 
NH 2005 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 3 years 12 
KS 2008 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 2 years 12 
KS 2011 Increase in loss carryback period from 0 to 3 years 13 
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Panel B. List of Loss Carryback Period Reductions.  
This table lists all state-level reductions in the length of tax loss carryback periods affecting firms in fiscal years 
1990-2011. Tax loss carryback period changes are identified from the Book of the States. 
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample firms 
    
ME 1990 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 4 
NM 1991 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 10 
RI 1992 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 10 
VT 1992 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 4 
VT 1996 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 7 
AL 1997 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 28 
NY 1997 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 293 
OK 1997 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 33 
AK 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 2 
DC 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 4 
DE 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 11 
GA 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 100 
HI 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 5 
IA 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 18 
IL 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 153 
IN 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 43 
KY 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 18 
MD 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 51 
ME 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 7 
MO 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 56 
MS 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 11 
ND 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 1 
VA 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 79 
WV 1998 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 5 
ID 1999 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 9 
DC 2000 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 5 
AK 2001 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 1 
LA 2001 Reduction in loss carryback period from 3 to 2 years 24 
ME 2002 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 2 
ND 2003 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 1 
IL 2004 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 118 
KY 2006 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 17 
VT 2006 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 2 
NH 2008 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 7 
IA 2009 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 12 
KS 2009 Removal of ability to carry back losses (reduction from 2 years to 0) 13 
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Panel C. List of Loss Carryforward Period Increases.  
This table lists all state-level increases in the length of tax loss carryforward periods affecting firms in fiscal years 
1990-2011. Tax loss carryforward period changes are identified from the Book of the States. 
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample firms 
    
AL 1990 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 15 years 11 
ID 1990 Increase in loss carryforward period from 10 to 15 years 10 
OH 1990 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 15 years 120 
TN 1991 Increase in loss carryforward period from 7 to 15 years 29 
MS 1992 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 15 years 7 
UT 1993 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 15 years 30 
CA 1994 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 15 years 458 
PA 1995 Increase in loss carryforward period from 0 to 2 years 143 
PA 1996 Increase in loss carryforward period from 2 to 3 years 145 
NM 1997 Increase in loss carryforward period from 0 to 5 years 4 
TX 1997 Increase in loss carryforward period from 0 to 5 years 316 
AK 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 2 
CA 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 4 to 5 years 583 
CO 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 97 
DE 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 11 
FL 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 163 
GA 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 100 
HI 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 5 
IA 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 18 
IL 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 153 
IN 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 43 
KY 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 18 
MD 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 51 
ME 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 7 
MO 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 56 
MS 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 11 
ND 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 1 
NY 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 283 
PA 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 3 to 10 years 140 
VA 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 79 
VT 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 8 
WV 1998 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 5 
DC 1999 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 7 
ID 1999 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 9 
NC 1999 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 15 years 56 
SC 1999 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 21 
CA 2000 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 10 years 574 
CT 2000 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 20 years 79 
CA 2001 Increase in loss carryforward period from 10 to 20 years 528 
LA 2001 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 24 
NH 2002 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 10 years 13 
OK 2002 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 23 
PA 2002 Increase in loss carryforward period from 10 to 20 years 136 
OH 2003 Increase in loss carryforward period from 15 to 20 years 103 
CA 2008 Increase in loss carryforward period from 10 to 20 years 454 
MA 2010 Increase in loss carryforward period from 5 to 20 years 132 
NJ 2011 Increase in loss carryforward period from 7 to 20 years 83 
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Panel D. List of Loss Carryforward Period Reductions.  
This table lists all state-level reductions in the length of tax loss carryforward periods affecting firms in fiscal years 
1990-2011. Tax loss carryforward period changes are identified from the Book of the States. 
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample firms 
    
NM 1991 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 15 to 5 years 10 
PA 1991 Removal of ability to carry forward losses (reduction from 3 years to 0) 131 
NM 1992 Removal of ability to carry forward losses (reduction from 5 years to 0) 9 
RI 1992 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 15 to 5 years 10 
CA 1993 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 15 to 5 years 442 
CA 1997 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 15 to 4 years 554 
CA 2002 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 20 to 10 years 529 
LA 2002 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 20 to 15 years 23 
IL 2004 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 20 to 12 years 118 
VT 2006 Reduction in loss carryforward period from 20 to 10 years 2 
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Table A.3. Effect of Tax Changes on Firm Risk: Alternative Standard Errors. 
We repeat the tests in Table 2 with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-
series correlations using a two-way cluster at the firm and year levels (Gow, I.D., Ormazabal, G., Taylor, D.J., 2010. 
Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in accounting research. The Accounting Review 85, 483–
512). In columns 1 and 2, we use contemporaneous changes in the firm’s home-state top marginal corporate income 
tax rate. In columns 3 and 4, we use lagged changes in the firm’s home-state top marginal corporate income tax rate. 
Columns 5 and 6 use the contemporaneous nexus-weighted change in tax rates as defined in Eq. (2). For variable 
definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and 
include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. 
Standard errors are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, 
the test for equal tax sensitivity (tax increase = -tax cut) is one-sided. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
magnitude of tax increase  -0.019*** -0.020***     
 0.006 0.006     
magnitude of tax cut 0.016 0.018     
 0.015 0.014     
lagged tax increase    -0.026*** -0.019***   
   0.004 0.004   
lagged tax cut   0.000 0.000   
   0.014 0.015   
nexus-weighted tax increase     -0.024*** -0.032*** 
     0.009 0.010 
nexus-weighted tax cut     0.014 0.017 
     0.016 0.018 
Change in …       
   GSP growth rate -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
   state unemployment rate 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Lagged change in …       
   log firm age -0.526*** -0.556*** -0.526*** -0.553*** -0.527*** -0.556*** 
 0.089 0.103 0.088 0.102 0.089 0.103 
   log firm size -0.242*** -0.325*** -0.242*** -0.325*** -0.242*** -0.325*** 
 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.024 
   log market/book 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.121*** 0.163*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 
 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.012 
   book leverage -0.300*** -0.389*** -0.301*** -0.392*** -0.300*** -0.389*** 
 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.037 
   cash surplus -0.250*** -0.253*** -0.248*** -0.247*** -0.249*** -0.253*** 
 0.034 0.038 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.038 
   loss carryforward 0.018 0.030*** 0.017 0.029*** 0.018 0.030*** 
 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 
   sales growth 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 
 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 
   stock return -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.055*** 
 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.010 
       
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 21.3% 21.0% 21.4% 21.1% 21.3% 21.0% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 0.05 0.03 4.52** 1.80* 0.48 0.83 
No. of firms 8,046 7,999 8,041 7,994 8,046 7,999 
No. of observations 64,447 64,221 64,435 64,200 64,447 64,221 
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Table A.4. Effect of Tax Changes on Firm Risk: Big and Small Tax Cuts. 
To investigate whether the insignificant coefficients on tax cuts reported in Table 2 are driven by the fact that tax 
cuts in our sample are, on average, smaller than tax increases (in absolute magnitude), we allow for a differential 
sensitivity to large and small tax cuts. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The 
unit of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to 
remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry 
shocks. The full set of controls (as in Table 2) and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the 
coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
magnitude of tax increase  -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
magnitude of large tax cut (≥50 bps) 0.012 0.013   
 0.015 0.014   
magnitude of small tax cut (<50 bps) 0.048 0.054   
 0.046 0.051   
magnitude of large tax cut (≥100 bps)   0.008 0.008 
   0.017 0.014 
magnitude of small tax cut (<100 bps)   0.041 0.048 
   0.031 0.035 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 21.3% 21.0% 21.3% 21.0% 
No. of firms 8,046 7,999 8,046 7,999 
No. of observations 64,447 64,221 64,447 64,221 
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Table A.5. Effect of Tax Changes on Risk for Firms with Tight or Lax Covenants. 
To test whether firms are constrained by their lenders from increasing risk in response to a tax cut, we use data from 
DealScan to measure the tightness of covenants. We include firms with zero leverage (according to Compustat) 
among firms that are unconstrained in this sense. Since DealScan does not track all borrowers and all types of 
borrowing, the sample size is reduced compared to our baseline tests. Columns 1 and 2 reestimate our Table 2 
baseline specifications in the restricted sample. The remaining columns allow the effect of tax cuts to vary with two 
alternative measures of the restrictiveness of a firm’s covenants. Specifically, for each firm-year, we compute the 
size-weighted average number of covenants and average slack across all loan facilities a firm has outstanding. Slack 
is the distance from the covenant threshold: for a covenant that sets a minimum limit, distance is computed as (r’–
r)/sigma, where r’ is the actual variable, r is the covenant threshold, and sigma is the standard deviation of r’; for a 
covenant that sets a maximum threshold, distance is calculated as – (r’–r)/sigma, where the extra negative sign is to 
ensure a consistent interpretation with that of the minimum type of covenant. We code firms as having few 
covenants if they either have zero leverage or at most one covenant (the sample median). We code firms as having 
high slack if they either have zero leverage or are at least one standard deviation above (below) the minimum 
(maximum) covenant threshold. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit 
of analysis is a firm-year. The full set of controls (as in Table 2) and industry-by-year fixed effects are included but 
not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics 
underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA 
volatility 
ROIC 
volatility 
ROA 
volatility 
ROIC 
volatility 
ROA 
volatility 
ROIC 
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
magnitude of tax increase  -0.033* -0.031* -0.033* -0.031* -0.033* -0.031* 
 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.017 
magnitude of tax cut 0.034 0.043* -0.028 -0.039 0.004 0.013 
 0.021 0.022 0.030 0.028 0.021 0.023 
   … × few covenants   0.087** 0.116***   
   0.034 0.035   
   … × high slack     0.060** 0.060 
     0.030 0.039 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 32.0% 31.0% 32.0% 31.0% 32.0% 31.0% 
No. of firms 5,092 5,068 5,092 5,068 5,092 5,068 
No. of observations 29,712 29,624 29,712 29,624 29,712 29,624 
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Table A.6. Potential Cross-State Spillovers. 
One identification concern is that tax changes in one state may trigger changes in the behavior of firms in the 
neighboring states. To address this concern, we restrict the set of control firms to those located in states that do not 
neighbor the treated state. (This contrasts with Table 5, where the set of control firms is restricted to those located in 
neighboring states.) This reduces the sample compared to the baseline models shown in Table 2. To address 
concerns stemming from the fact that corporate tax changes occasionally coincide with changes in state taxes on 
bank profits or in investment incentive programs (i.e., tax credits for investment, R&D, and job creation), columns 3 
and 4 control explicitly for these concurrent changes. The unit of analysis in each specification is a firm-year. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-year fixed effects. The full set of controls 
(as in Table 2) and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. For variable definitions and details of their 
construction, see Appendix B. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in 
italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level (two-sided), respectively. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for equal tax sensitivity (tax 
increase = -tax cut) is one-sided. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
magnitude of tax increase  -0.022** -0.026*** -0.019** -0.027** 
 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.011 
magnitude of tax cut 0.023 0.030* 0.007 0.007 
 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.013 
Other coincident tax changes     
   increase in state tax on banks   -0.009 0.003 
   0.018 0.016 
   cut in state tax on banks   0.044*** 0.057*** 
   0.014 0.021 
   increase in state investment tax credits   -0.005*** -0.004* 
   0.002 0.002 
   cut in state investment tax credits   -0.004 0.001 
   0.004 0.004 
   increase in state R&D tax credits   -0.003 -0.001 
   0.003 0.003 
   cut in state R&D tax credits   -0.006 -0.005 
   0.004 0.004 
   increase in state job tax credits   -0.008 -0.012 
   0.016 0.015 
   cut in state job tax credits   -0.009 -0.008 
   0.034 0.036 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 25.7% 25.1% 25.7% 25.1% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 0.01 0.04 0.66 1.19
No. of firms 7,160 7,114 7,160 7,114 
No. of observations 40,900 40,751 40,900 40,751 
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Table A.7. Falsification Test. 
This table reports the results of estimating Christensen et al.’s (2016) falsification test of the potential bias induced 
by unobserved confounds. The test regresses the part of the outcome variable that is related to the observed 
determinants of the confound (here: the change in risk taking predicted from the economic and political controls 
included in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5) on the treatment variable (here: the change in the tax rate). A small 
coefficient in the falsification test, compared to the estimated treatment effect in the baseline test, suggests that the 
baseline treatment effect is unlikely to reflect unobserved confounds. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the 
falsification test for the full sample, and columns 3 and 4 present the results for the neighboring-state sample used in 
Table 5. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis in each 
column is a firm-year. The full set of controls (as in Table 2) and industry-by-year fixed effects are included but not 
reported for brevity. Columns 3 and 4 further control explicitly for other concurrent tax changes and include group-
year fixed effects, where a treated state and its neighboring states are coded as a group. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We 
use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Change in log … 
 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
ROA  
volatility 
ROIC  
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
magnitude of tax increase  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
magnitude of tax cut -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Other coincident tax changes     
   increase in state tax on banks   -0.004 -0.007** 
   0.003 0.003 
   cut in state tax on banks   0.002 -0.002 
   0.005 0.005 
   increase in state investment tax credits   0.000 0.001 
   0.001 0.001 
   cut in state investment tax credits   0.000 0.001* 
   0.000 0.000 
   increase in state R&D tax credits   0.000 0.000 
   0.001 0.001 
   cut in state R&D tax credits   0.000 -0.001 
   0.001 0.001 
   increase in state job tax credits   0.005* 0.006** 
   0.003 0.003 
   cut in state job tax credits   -0.002 0.000 
   0.011 0.010 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group-year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
R2 42.9% 46.8% 69.6% 72.2% 
No. of firms 8,046 7,999 6,586 6,547 
No. of observations 64,447 64,221 29,613 29,498 
     
 
  
 6 
 
Table A.8. Effect of Tax Changes on Operational Choices. 
Columns 1 and 2 report a variation on our Table 7 specification, restricting the set of control firms to those located 
in a neighboring state, as in Table 5. Columns 3 and 4 report a variation on our Table 7 specification, allowing firms’ 
choices of operating risk in response to a tax cut to vary with their financial leverage (which proxies for constraints 
on risk taking imposed by lenders). As in Table 3, we code firms as having high (low) financial leverage if their 
book leverage at the end of the previous fiscal year is above (below) the sample median. For variable definitions and 
details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All specifications 
are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and include 
industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. We include the same controls and fixed effects as in Table 
5 or Table 7, as appropriate. These are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Change in operating cycle 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
magnitude of tax increase  -1.244***  -1.702***  
 0.570  0.379  
magnitude of tax cut -0.163  0.632  
 1.167  0.877  
   … × low leverage    -1.399  
   1.412  
nexus-weighted tax increase  -2.774**  -3.051** 
  1.321  1.163 
nexus-weighted tax cut  -1.234  0.815 
  1.444  1.690 
   … × low leverage    -3.019 
    2.362 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  15.9% 15.9% 11.5% 10.1% 
No. of firms 6,511 6,511 7,952 7,952 
No. of observations 29,243 29,243 63,472 63,472 
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Table A.9. Effect of Tax Changes on Acquisitions. 
We estimate OLS regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their M&A activity in response to 
changes in state corporate income taxes. The dependent variable change in the number of acquisitions (or diversifying 
acquisitions) is defined as the difference between the number of acquisitions (or diversifying acquisitions) in year t 
and the number of acquisitions (or diversifying acquisitions) in year t–1. The number of acquisitions (or diversifying 
acquisitions) is defined following Gormley and Matsa (2016). Specifically, the number of acquisitions is calculated 
using SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions Database after excluding acquisitions meeting any of the following criteria: 
(1) the ratio of the deal size to the market value of the acquirer’s assets is less than 1%; (2) the acquiring firm 
controlled more than 50% of the target’s equity prior to the announcement date or less than 100% after the 
acquisition was completed; (3) the ultimate parent of the acquirer and the target are the same; (4) either the acquirer 
or the target is a financial firm; or (5) the deal was not completed within 1,000 days of the announcement date. The 
number of diversifying acquisitions is the number of acquisitions a firm undertakes for which its primary SIC 
industry does not coincide with any of the target firm’s SIC codes. In columns 1 and 2, we use contemporaneous 
changes in the firm’s home-state top marginal corporate income tax rate. In columns 3 and 4, we use lagged changes 
in the firm’s home-state top marginal corporate income tax rate. Columns 5 and 6 use the contemporaneous nexus-
weighted change in tax rates as defined in Eq. (2). The unit of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and 
include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. We include the same controls and fixed effects as 
in Table 2. These are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state 
level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Change in the number of … 
 acquisitions 
diversifying 
acquisitions acquisitions 
diversifying 
acquisitions acquisitions 
diversifying 
acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
magnitude of tax increase  0.002 0.000     
 0.012 0.009     
magnitude of tax cut 0.006 0.000     
 0.010 0.007     
lagged tax increase    0.005 0.007   
   0.006 0.004   
lagged tax cut   0.019 0.010   
   0.014 0.010   
nexus-weighted tax increase     -0.004 -0.003 
     0.013 0.011 
nexus-weighted tax cut     0.015 0.003 
     0.009 0.007 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  14.2% 13.8% 14.4% 14.1% 14.2% 13.8% 
No. of firms 8,077 8,077 7,931 7,931 8,077 8,077 
No. of observations 64,721 64,721 63,762 63,762 64,721 64,721 
       
 
  
 8 
 
Table A.10. Effect of Tax Changes on Equity Volatility. 
We estimate OLS regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their equity volatility in response to 
changes in state corporate income taxes in their headquarter state. Column 1 models equity volatility and column 2 
models deleveraged equity volatility. Equity volatility is defined as the standard deviation of monthly returns over 
the 12-month period ending at the fiscal year end (measured using data from CRSP). We annualize equity volatility 
by multiplying it by 12 . Deleveraged equity volatility is defined as equity volatility times the ratio of market 
capitalization (Compustat items prcc_f × csho) to the sum of market capitalization and the book value of debt 
(Compustat items dlttq + dlcq). For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit 
of analysis in each column is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove 
firm fixed effects in the levels equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The 
fixed effects are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are 
shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for equal tax 
sensitivity (tax increase = -tax cut) is one-sided. 
 
 Change in log … 
 equity volatility 
deleveraged 
equity volatility 
 (1) (2) 
      
magnitude of tax increase  -0.023*** -0.020*** 
 0.005 0.006 
magnitude of tax cut 0.002 -0.003 
 0.005 0.006 
Change in …   
   GSP growth rate -0.003** -0.002 
 0.001 0.001 
   state unemployment rate 0.022*** 0.025*** 
 0.005 0.005 
Lagged change in …   
   log firm age -0.032* -0.137*** 
 0.018 0.020 
   log firm size -0.118*** -0.175*** 
 0.007 0.010 
   log market/book -0.084*** -0.113*** 
 0.006 0.008 
   book leverage 0.167*** 0.183*** 
 0.026 0.028 
   cash surplus -0.114*** -0.062*** 
 0.016 0.015 
   loss carryforward 0.011* 0.015* 
 0.006 0.007 
   sales growth 0.006 0.010** 
 0.004 0.005 
   stock return -0.024*** -0.011*** 
 0.004 0.003 
   
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2 25.1% 22.4% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 8.57*** 6.74***
No. of firms 7,867 7,865 
No. of observations 63,017 62,992 
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Table A.11. Effect of Tax Changes on Earnings Management. 
We estimate OLS regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their performance-matched 
discretionary accruals in response to state corporate income tax changes. The dependent variable change in 
performance-matched discretionary accruals is defined as the difference between performance-matched 
discretionary accruals measured at t and those measured at t–1. We estimate performance matched discretionary 
accruals as total accruals minus predicted accruals, where predicted accruals is calculated using the formula:  
PR_ACCRit = b0 + b1×(1/ATit) + b2×(SALEit–SALEit-1–RECTit+RECTit-1) + b3×PPEit + b4×ROAit-1. The firm-year 
specific parameters b0 to b4 are estimated using within SIC2-industry-year regressions: ACCRjt = b0 + b1×(1/ATjt) + 
b2×(SALEjt–SALEjt-1) + b3×PPEjt + b4×ROAjt-1 + errorjt. In estimating the parameters for firm i in year t, the 
observation of firm i in year t is excluded from the regression. ACCR is total accruals, calculated as Compustat item 
ibc–oancf+xidoc; AT is total assets (Compustat item at); SALE is total sales (Compustat item sale); RECT is 
accounting receivables (Compustat item rect); PPE is property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item ppegt); ROA 
is return on assets (Compustat item pi/at). In columns 2 and 3, we restrict the set of control firms to those located in 
a neighboring state, thus excluding far-away states (i.e., firms in states that neither experience a tax rate change nor 
border a state that does are excluded). For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The 
unit of analysis is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed 
effects in the levels equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The full set of 
controls (as in Table 2) and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, 
and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 
Change in performance-matched  
discretionary accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
magnitude of tax increase 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
 0.001 0.001 0.002 
magnitude of tax cut -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 
 0.004 0.006 0.005 
Other coincident tax changes    
   increase in state tax on banks   0.007** 
   0.003 
   cut in state tax on banks   0.007 
   0.009 
   increase in state investment tax credits   -0.001 
   0.001 
   cut in state investment tax credits   -0.001** 
   0.001 
   increase in state R&D tax credits   0.000 
   0.000 
   cut in state R&D tax credits   -0.001 
   0.001 
   increase in state job tax credits   -0.006 
   0.005 
   cut in state job tax credits   0.002 
   0.010 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 18.7% 24.4% 24.4% 
No. of firms 7,090 5,765 5,765 
No. of observations 56,779 26,058 26,058 
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Table A.12. Alternative Cutoffs of Loss Offset Rules.  
We repeat the tests reported in Table 8 with alternative cutoffs for the loss offset rules. Columns 1 and 3 of Panel A 
include firms headquartered in a state that (1) does not allow losses to be carried back and (2) does not permit losses 
to be carried forward for more than 12 years. Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A include only the remaining sample firms. 
Columns 1 and 3 of Panel B include firms headquartered in a state that (1) does not allow losses to be carried back 
and (2) does not permit losses to be carried forward for more than 15 years. Columns 2 and 4 of Panel B include 
only the remaining sample firms. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix B. The unit 
of analysis is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to remove firm fixed effects 
in the levels equations and include industry-by-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. The full set of controls 
(as in Table 2) and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. The tests for equal tax sensitivity across 
columns 1 and 2 and across columns 3 and 4 are based on fully-interacted models. Reflecting the signed nature of 
the predictions, the tests for equal tax sensitivity are one-sided. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
Panel A. Alternative Carryforward Cutoff of 12 Years.  
 
 Change in log … 
 ROA volatility  ROIC volatility 
 
Low loss  
offset ability 
High loss  
offset ability  
Low loss  
offset ability 
High loss  
offset ability 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
magnitude of tax increase  -0.030*** -0.004 -0.036*** 0.014 
 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.023 
magnitude of tax cut 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.014 
 0.022 0.018 0.019 0.020 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 29.8% 27.0% 28.7% 26.9% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F)     
  Tax increases: (1) vs. (2) or (3) vs. (4) 1.41  3.45** 
No. of firms 4,383 5,715  4,365 5,674 
No. of observations 26,863 37,584  26,771 37,440 
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Panel B. Alternative Carryforward Cutoff of 15 Years.  
 
 Change in log … 
 ROA volatility  ROIC volatility 
 
Low loss  
offset ability 
High loss  
offset ability  
Low loss  
offset ability 
High loss  
offset ability 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
magnitude of tax increase  -0.027*** 0.018 -0.033*** 0.049 
 0.008 0.028 0.010 0.032 
magnitude of tax cut 0.014 -0.001 0.020 0.000 
 0.018 0.021 0.017 0.023 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 24.5% 33.8% 24.0% 33.6% 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F)     
  Tax increases: (1) vs. (2) or (3) vs. (4) 2.38*  6.22*** 
No. of firms 6,088 4,258  6,063 4,226 
No. of observations 39,775 24,672  36,640 24,571 
            
 
